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ABSTRACT 
 Engaging in search behaviors is a critical activity of firms.  Traditionally, 
the extent to which firms engage in search has been modeled as the level of R&D in 
which firms engage, or their patenting propensity.  However, all R&D efforts and 
patents are not uniform in the type of search in which they are focused.  Search 
efforts can either be directed towards gathering new knowledge and technologies 
(exploratory search) or better understanding the knowledge and technologies they 
currently possess (exploitative search).  The type of search in which firms engage is 
related to outcomes such as technology discovery, new product launches and 
financial performance.  Thus, the distinction between the types of search in which 
firms engage is an important one.  However, it has largely been overlooked in 
studies using R&D expenses or patenting propensity as measures of search efforts. 
 Because of the importance of understanding the types of search in which 
firms engage, I sought to understand what drives each type of search.  Drawing 
upon the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Upper Echelons Perspective, I 
examined how problems firms face, slack resources, executive demographics and 
executive compensation drive exploratory and exploitative search.  Support for my 
original hypotheses was poor, with only CEO age and equity ownership being 
statistically significant.  However, post-hoc analysis revealed there are substantial 
differences between large and small firms in the pharmaceutical industry in what 
drives search, suggesting promising avenues for future research.  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 All firms possess unique stores of knowledge and possess varying levels of 
abilities to identify, acquire and exploit new knowledge (Grant, 1996).  The extent 
to which they are able to use their stores of knowledge and learn new knowledge 
influences their financial performance and even their survival (Grant, 1996).  As 
firms gain mastery over what they know, they are able to leverage it to discover 
new knowledge and reap gains in efficiencies by honing key routines and processes 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).   
However, over time, knowledge held by firms grows old, technologies 
become outdated and core competencies that once generated positive performance 
outcomes deteriorate into rigidities that have detrimental performance effects 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992).  To stave off negative performance and increase the 
chances of long-term survival, firms must, at some point and to some degree, search 
for and acquire new knowledge (March, 1991).  That new knowledge may come 
from searching internally and more fully exploiting areas of general familiarity (i.e., 
exploitation), or it may come from searching externally and exploring for new 
knowledge to incorporate into the firm (i.e., exploration) (March, 1991).  Given the 
choice between exploration and exploitation, what determines which kind of search 
in which firms will engage?  The primary focus of this dissertation is the 
investigation of how critical antecedents of firm search efforts influence the type of 
search in which firms engage (i.e., exploratory or exploitative). 
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Exploration versus exploitation 
These two dominant ways of searching for knowledge were described in the 
seminal article by March (1991) as exploration and exploitation.  Exploratory 
search, while not defined explicitly by March, can be conceptualized as the process 
of risk taking, discovery and experimentation in an effort to acquire new knowledge 
(March, 1991: 71, 85).  While the results of exploration are “uncertain, distant, and 
often negative” (March, 1991: 85), exploring external to the organization may result 
in the discovery of new knowledge.  Exploitative search, the alternative search 
strategy, can be conceptualized as the process of refining and more fully 
developing, utilizing and understanding currently held knowledge (1991: 71).  
Returns from exploitative search are more frequently “positive, proximate, and 
predictable” (1991: 85), suggesting that exploiting currently-held knowledge tends 
to yield consistent results.  
Given the choice between exploratory and exploitative search, what do firms 
do?  Are they able to engage in both forms of search?  If so, what are the 
determinants of each kind of search?  When firms engage in exploitative search, 
they develop certain processes and routines that enable them to make use of their 
already possessed knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  Likewise, when firms 
engage in exploratory search, they develop alternate processes and routines to 
incorporate new knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993).  This dissertation 
examines the critical antecedents of exploratory and exploitative search and when 
each might be more likely to be pursued. 
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Problem- and Slack-based search 
In their seminal work on the behavioral theory of the firm, Cyert and March 
(1963) described two fundamental drivers of organizational search efforts: problems 
and organizational slack.  When firms encounter problems of various kinds they are 
motivated to resolve the problems.  Problems frequently are generated by a lack of 
knowledge leading to undesirable outcomes (Chang, 1996).  To resolve such 
problems, firms often engage in search behaviors to acquire the missing knowledge.  
Similarly, when firms have resources beyond that which is required for operation, 
they often use such resources to more fully develop knowledge they currently 
possess or acquire new knowledge from external sources to add to what they 
already possess (Greve, 2003).  Often the efforts employed towards that end are 
searching for knowledge, either internally within the firm or externally to the firm 
(March, 1991). 
In addition to providing a general impetus for initiating search efforts (e.g., 
Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2003, 2007), what type of search (i.e., exploratory 
or exploitative) do problems and slack encourage?  Prospect theory has posited that 
when individuals operate from a “loss” perspective, they tend to be more risk 
taking.  In the current application, I explore the extent to which problem-based 
search is analogous to operating from a “loss” perspective.  Regarding slack search, 
I extend prior literature which has examined the impact of slack on innovation but 
has yet to be extended explicitly to search efforts.  Moreover, in addition to the 
impact of problems and slack on search within firms, there are other influences at 
work – namely the influences of the Top Management Team (TMT).  As the 
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individuals who are able to shape much of resource allocation within firms (Daily 
and Dalton, 1994), investigating the central role of TMTs in determining the type of 
search in which firms engage is critical. 
Top Management Teams 
To the degree that TMTs do influence the search efforts of firms, the type of 
search that executives elect to pursue is strongly influenced by their underlying 
beliefs and cognitive frames by which they view situations (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984).  The psychological construct of risk preferences (e.g., Smith, Collins, and 
Clark, 2005) is one such underlying characteristic of TMT members that may be 
instrumental in understanding what kind of search managers favor.  Given that 
exploratory search for new knowledge is generally more risky than the exploitative 
search of knowledge already known within firms (He and Wong, 2004; March, 
1991), there is likely a connection between risk preferences and the type of search 
in which search firms engage.  Thus, in order to better understand how problems 
and slack precipitate organizational search, I seek to examine how the risk 
preferences of executives directly affect search efforts and how they moderate the 
effects of problems and slack.   
Prior work has examined the influence of CEO risk preferences on outcomes 
such as acquisition and divestiture propensity (Sanders, 2001), stock price 
variability (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006) and investments in R&D (Barker III 
and Mueller, 2004).  However, despite the prominent role of CEOs, other work has 
recognized the importance of, and encouraged additional research into, the entire 
TMT in major firm level outcomes such as foreign expansion (Barkema and 
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Shvyrkov, 2007), strategic change (Boeker, 1997) and innovation (Bantel and 
Jackson, 1989).  In this dissertation, I examine the influence of the TMT on the 
search efforts of firms.  Taking this approach allows me to examine how dynamics 
within the TMT influence organizational search, whereas examining the risk 
preferences of only the CEO would not allow me to examine these additional 
interesting aspects. 
Research Questions 
To summarize the above introductory discussion, this dissertation seeks to 
examine how critical antecedents (problems, slack and top management teams) of 
firm search efforts influence the type of search firms engage in (i.e., exploratory or 
exploitative).  To explore these relationships, I investigate the following questions.  
The constructs discussed are depicted in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 
TMT Factors
CEO Age
Compensation
Ownership
Exploratory Search
Exploitative Search
Slack‐based Search
Problem‐based Search
 
1. How do problems affect the amount and type of search (i.e., exploratory or 
exploitative) in which firms engage? 
2. How do financial slack resources affect the amount and type of search in 
which firms engage?  
3. How does CEO age impact the type of search in which firms engage? 
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4. How does TMT compensation affect the amount and type of search in which 
firms engage?  
5. How does TMT equity ownership affect the type of search in which firms 
engage? 
Theoretical Contributions 
Main Contribution 
The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the examination of 
the core drivers of exploratory and exploitative search within firms.  In particular, I 
articulate theoretical reasons why problems, slack and executive risk preferences 
should influence exploration and exploitation and test hypotheses towards that end. 
Secondary Contribution 
While prior work has examined antecedents of product innovation (e.g., 
Greve, 2003; 2007), there has not been such a focus on the antecedents of search 
that eventually lead to such innovation.  To better understand how firms generate 
exploratory and exploitative innovations, it is critical to better understand the search 
efforts in which firms engage that ultimately lead to such innovations.  This 
research directly focuses on such search efforts. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Organizational Search 
 At the heart of this dissertation is an examination of the key antecedents of 
organizational search.  At its core, organizational search is the process by which 
firms seek knowledge (Cyert and March, 1963).  Regardless of the location or 
motivation of the search, or the activities that comprise it, when firms seek 
knowledge, they engage in search.  Searching for new knowledge (i.e., exploratory 
search) is a key way in which firms add resources that can lead to competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996).  Searching within currently-held 
knowledge not only allows firms to use more efficiently that which they already 
possess (March, 1991), but also enables them to more easily identify and acquire 
new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).     Engaging in search activities (in 
general) has been linked with creating value (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), gaining 
competitive advantage (Katila and Ahuja, 2002), and facilitating innovation and 
change (Dougherty, 1992; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
The Need for Search 
The need to engage in search activities is paramount for firms.  As firms 
utilize existing knowledge, they develop core capabilities on which they base their 
competitive stance (e.g., Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980).  Without investment into such 
capabilities, over time, the routines and processes that allowed the firm to create 
efficiencies related to such capabilities become harder to change (Winter, 2000), 
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transforming the capabilities into rigidities and preventing firms from adapting to 
changing industry and environmental demands (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  Engaging 
in exploratory and exploitative search are two ways that firms can invest into such 
capabilities as they either bring new knowledge into the firm (via exploration) or 
better understand the knowledge already contained within the firm (via 
exploitation).  However, in the absence of search, the valuable resources and 
capabilities of firms can erode, devolving the firm from a state of competitive 
advantage to competitive disadvantage (Barney, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992).   
The Cost of Search 
 Despite the critical need of firms to engage in search activities, search is not 
free (Lant and Mezias, 1990).  Indeed, the search process can be rather resource 
intensive, depending upon where and how firms engage in their search.  Depending 
upon the degree to which they search in new areas, areas with immature 
technologies and areas distant from their core knowledge sources, new knowledge 
search may be difficult and, by extension, resource intensive (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Stuart and Podolny, 1996).  Owing to the fact that exploring in previously 
unexplored areas is more difficult and more time consuming than exploiting 
currently held knowledge, exploratory search is generally more expensive and 
resource intensive than exploitative search.  Despite the costs, however, engaging in 
search is important for firms to allow them to renew themselves (Zott, 2003). 
Search ability 
The ability to search is, itself, an ability that firms may nurture and develop 
as they gain skills in seeking out knowledge (e.g., Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Given 
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the different ways that firms can engage in search and the different types of 
knowledge available for searching within, different skills and abilities may be 
required to successfully search in different areas (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992).   Thus, depending on the unique skill sets of firms, they 
will have differing levels of success with different types of search strategies.  In his 
seminal article, March (1991) identified two core ways in which firms learn through 
search activities: exploration and exploitation.  These two distinct search strategies 
have since been conceptualized as distant and local search (Stuart and Podolny, 
1996) and experimental and imitative search (Zott, 2003).  Both of these 
conceptualizations articulate the tension within search between uncertainty and 
certainty, far away and close at hand, and undiscovered and previously exposed 
search.  This tension is reflected in the fundamental differences between the 
exploratory search to discover new knowledge and the search to more fully exploit 
current stores of knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; March, 1991).   
Explore and Exploit 
March’s (1991) construct of “exploration and exploitation” has met with 
increasing interest as research incorporating explore-exploit notions has flourished 
since its publication.  The construct has found its way into numerous strategy topics 
(Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006), such as: alliance formation (Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), corporate venture capital investing 
(Wadhwa and Kotha, 2006), interpersonal and group learning (Miller, Zhao, and 
Calantone, 2006; Taylor and Greve, 2006), organizational knowledge and learning 
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Levinthal and March, 1993; Nerkar, 2003), 
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entrepreneurship (Beckman, 2006), organizational renewal (Danneels, 2002; 
Dougherty, 1992), ambidexterity (He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Smith 
and Tushman, 2005), and innovation (Greve, 2007; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001).  
March (1991) introduces the idea of exploration as being concerned with 
ideas such as “search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, [and] innovation” (1991: 71) and whose “returns are uncertain, distant, 
and often negative” (1991: 85).  In contrast, exploitation focuses on such things as 
“refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, [and] 
execution” (1991: 71) and whose “returns are positive, proximate, and predictable” 
(1991: 85).  In developing this construct of exploration and exploitation, March 
(1991) recognized the inherent conflict and paradoxical relationship between the 
two forms of learning activities: firms must balance a focus on risk-taking and 
refinement, discovery and efficiency, and experimentation with execution.   
Antecedents of Search 
Antecedents of search have been conceptualized in different ways.  While 
the two original ideas of search drivers were problems facing the firm and the 
presence of slack resources (Cyert and March, 1963), there have been other ideas. 
Before exploring problem-based and slack-based search more specifically, I briefly 
discuss other reasons for search efforts.  These reasons include arguments that 
search is necessary for survival (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985) and 
that it is demanded by the internal (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and environmental 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985) forces. 
11 
 
Other Types of Antecedents of Search 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer argued that in some industries search is 
necessary simply for survival (1985).  In these industries, whether search is driven 
by market competition (Bulow et al., 1985) or as a result of pressures from market 
entry (Kadiyali, 1996), firms must engage in search or face extinction.  At the other 
end of the “merely survive” versus “thrive” continuum, firms may engage in search 
from a desire to leapfrog their competitors (Ratliff, 2002; Schilling, 2003).  While 
the leapfrog motivation is quite different than simply trying to survive within the 
industry, in either case, firms are engaging in search efforts to improve their 
likelihood of survival and increase performance. 
Two other antecedents of search that have been examined play off ideas that 
search behaviors are constrained by internal and environmental forces.  As to the 
former, inertia and routines within firms encourage firms to engage in search 
behaviors that conform with what they have done in the past (Greve, 2007; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984).  Inertia and routines serve as constraints within firms because 
processes are in place which facilitates engaging in certain types of search, in 
certain ways, to certain intensities.  Additionally, environmental forces external to 
firms encourage them to act in certain ways (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985).  In this 
case, to the degree that other firms within an industry are engaging in search 
activities, firms would feel pressure to likewise engage in search activities.  This is 
distinguished from previously discussed antecedents in that external pressures may 
exist regardless of survival or leapfrogging concerns. 
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While these all have particular nuances, they can still be couched somewhat 
in terms of problem- and slack-based search.  Survival and leapfrog motivated 
search are both tied to problem-based search in that both are trying to overcome 
some sort of problem.  Survival-based search is attempting to overcome the 
problem of failure, while the leapfrog-induced searching firms are trying to 
overcome the perceived problem of underperformance relative to their performance 
goals (i.e., above their competitors).   
The degrees to which firms engage in problem- and slack-based search are 
influenced by the broader environment in which firms are located.  In particular, the 
search behaviors of dominant firms within the industry may influence the search 
behavior of other firms within the industry.   
Whether stemming from survival, leapfrog or environmental conformity 
concerns, once the types of search behavior are in place, then the inertia and 
routines of firms encourage firms to maintain their particular levels of search.  Once 
the systems and procedures are in place to engage in particular types of search, it is 
far easier to allow the systems to replicate themselves than to try to re-create them.   
On the positive side, this allows firms to replicate themselves with minimal 
effort, which increases the likelihood of survival.  On the flip side, if changes to 
search behaviors are needed, inertia can prevent such necessary changes from 
taking place.  As touched on, these other types of search routines are really sub-
types or secondary to the two dominant types of search: problem-based and slack-
based.  We turn to those next. 
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Problem-Based Search 
When firms encounter problems of various kinds, they typically seek to 
address such problems (Cyert and March, 1963).  Frequently, the problems 
encountered stem from the failure of something to perform as well as expected.  
Within the realm of firm operations, there are many different types of problems that 
firms may experience.  For example, firms may experience problems related to 
product recalls, increased competition, resource scarcity or inadequate legitimacy.  
While all of these may be valid problems that lead to search efforts, they will 
ultimately be manifested in lower performance.  Thus, I focus on problem-based 
search as that prompted by poor financial performance.   
Generally, firms experience financial problems when their realized level of 
performance falls short of their potential performance (Chang, 1996; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Duncan and Weiss, 1979).  First, it may take the form of failing to 
meet analyst expectations.  This shortfall stems from failing to meet external 
expectations of performance levels, which may not have been entirely reasonable to 
begin with.  Or, firms may realize performance lower than the industry average.  
This type of underperformance is also externally determined but is in relation to the 
firms’ peers in the industry.  Finally, financial failure may take the form of a decline 
in performance from the last relevant period (month, quarter or year).  In contrast to 
the other two forms of failure, this form of expectation is internally determined and 
is based on the prior performance of the firm.   
Regardless of how the benchmarks are set or which ones are unattained, 
when firms fail to meet their goals, several outcomes may follow.  Some of the 
14 
 
outcomes from failure include downsizing (Adhmadjian and Robinson, 2001), 
adherence to loosing strategies (McDonald and Westphal, 2003), top management 
team turnover (Boone et al., 2004), new market entry (Greve, 1998), strategic 
reorientation (Boeker, 1997; Ketchen Jr. and Palmer, 1999; Lant, Milliken, and 
Batra, 1992) and an increase in innovation (Bolton, 1993; Greve, 2003). 
In addition to (and often preceding) these specific outcomes, firms engage in 
search behaviors following performance shortfalls to determine how to respond to 
the problems they have encountered (Cyert and March, 1963).  This perspective, as 
articulated by the behavioral theory of the firm, argues that managers frequently 
compare outcomes with pre-determined goals.  When the goals are not attained, 
they attempt to address that problem by engaging in search behaviors to identify 
appropriate remedies to the problems they have encountered.   
While such search efforts may result in changes to strategy and the 
incorporation of new ideas (e.g., Ketchen Jr. and Palmer, 1999), it does not 
necessarily have to do so.  Given that search efforts may take the shape of 
exploratory or exploitative search (or some degree of both), further research is 
needed to explore what type of search firms select.  Theory building towards 
specific hypotheses regarding what type of search (exploratory or exploitative) in 
which firms will engage is discussed in the hypotheses section, below.   
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Slack-Based Search 
Definitions of slack 
Since its earliest formal use by Cyert and March (1963), organizational 
slack has been studied by many scholars in many contexts.  Building off earlier 
work by Barnard, (1938) March and Simon (1958), and Cyert and March (1963) 
conceptualized slack as  “payments to members of the coalition in excess of what is 
required to maintain the organization” (36).  Since that time, numerous definitions 
and conceptualizations of slack have been offered.  Among them include a 
definition by Dimmick and Murray, in which slack is described as “those resources 
which an organization has acquired which are not committed to a necessary 
expenditure.  In essence, these are resources which can be used in a discretionary 
manner for various purposes” (Dimmick and Murray, 1978: 616).   
Nohria and Gulati defined slack as “the pool of resources in an organization 
that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of 
organizational output (Nohria and Gulati, 1996: 1246).  Geiger and Cashen defined 
it as “the resources in or available to an organization that are in excess of the 
minimum necessary to produce a given level of organizational output” (Geiger and 
Cashen, 2002: 69).  While all of the various definitions have merit and highlight 
certain elements of slack, I adopt the definition offered by March and paraphrased 
by Bourgeois (1981): 
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which 
allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for 
adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate 
changes in strategy with respect to the external environment (p30). 
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Kinds of slack 
From this general understanding of the idea of slack, the various ways in 
which slack has been specifically conceptualized has evolved since its introduction 
(Bourgeios, 1981; Bourgeios and Singh, 1983; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Sharfman 
et al., 1988; Tan and Gallupe, 2006; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and Voss, 2008).  From its 
earliest conceptualization as the difference between what is minimally required to 
retain employee participation and what is actually paid them (March and Simon, 
1958), differences between types of slack have been elucidated.  Bourgeois (1981) 
summarized previous descriptions into two main camps: slack used for internal 
maintenance and slack used as a facilitator of strategic behavior.   
Regarding internal maintenance, slack can be used as an inducement to 
attract individuals to the organization (Barnard, 1938; Cyert and March, 1963; 
March and Simon, 1958), for conflict resolution (Cyert and March, 1963; Pondy, 
1967) and as a workflow buffer (Galbraith, 1973; Pondy, 1967; Thompson, 1967).  
In each of these cases, slack is thought of in terms of its relation to individual, sub-
unit and workflow operations (Bourgeios, 1981).  The buffering component of 
slack, described by Thompson (1967,) is particularly salient as the buffer provides 
firms with the ability to engage in search while still protecting their core from 
external threats.   
Additionally, Bourgeois (1981) considers how slack is used to facilitate 
strategic behavior – with this focus on the firm level.  In this case, slack is 
considered to facilitate three broad types of strategic behaviors: political behaviors 
(March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1945), satisficing through bounded search (March 
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and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1945) and search behaviors leading to innovation (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Hambrick and Snow, 1977).  In focusing on slack as a facilitator 
of search behaviors, I specifically build upon the uses of slack as a buffer 
(Thompson, 1967) and as a facilitator of search (Cyert and March, 1963) that 
provides firms the security and ability to engage in search.    
Available slack 
Using financial indicators as measures of slack, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) 
expounded upon the conceptualizations of slack as a facilitator of strategic 
behaviors and further delineated types of slack.  Digging further, they differentiate 
between types of slack in terms of their ease of recovery.  The most easily 
recoverable form of slack is that of available slack, or what others have called “high 
discretion slack” (Sharfman et al., 1988).  Available slack represents resources that 
are not tied to specific needs and operations of firms and can be easily allocated as 
firms desire (Bourgeios and Singh, 1983).  Having on-hand resources available for 
disparate uses grants managers broad freedom in how and for what purposes they 
use such resources.  The other two forms of slack vary somewhat in terms of their 
ease of use: potential and recoverable slack.   
Potential Slack 
Potential slack represents the level of excess resources firms could access if 
they so desired (Bourgeios and Singh, 1983).  This is typically conceptualized in 
terms of firms’ ability to borrow funds from external sources to create additional 
available slack.  However, even if firms have the objective ability or capacity to 
borrow additional resources, actually acquiring such resources is not always entirely 
18 
 
in their power, making this form of slack more difficult to access than available 
slack.   
Recoverable Slack 
The third and most difficult to access type of slack is recoverable slack.  
This type of slack is represented by the amount of excess resources within firms 
that can not normally be accessed by firms except when firms face adversity 
(Bourgeios and Singh, 1983).  For example, when departments are overstaffed, have 
overpaid managers and have expenses that are too high, they are not using their 
resources in the most efficient manner (Geiger and Cashen, 2002).  When times are 
going well, firms are not typically concerned with recovering such slack resources.  
However, when things go poorly and firms have to make cutbacks, these areas 
represent buffers that firms can attempt to access to recover additional resources.  
Since the recovery process entails first identifying where excess resources are 
located and then attempting to reduce the buffer layer, the recovery process can be 
uncertain and difficult to undertake.  
Outcomes of Slack 
Slack has been argued to have both positive and negative implications for 
firms.  On the positive side, at a high level, slack helps firms survive environmental 
jolts and changes in performance that might otherwise incapacitate them (Meyer, 
1982).  Considering its ability as a facilitator of strategic behavior, slack can allow 
firms to pursue innovation even in environments with low resources (Cyert and 
March, 1963), relieve managers of the burden of begging for every penny when 
they seek to pursue opportunities (Nohria and Gulati, 1996), enter new product and 
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geographic markets even in the face of various uncertainties such strategies might 
hold (Bourgeios, 1981; Hambrick and Snow, 1977; Moses, 1992) and search for 
new knowledge and opportunities (Levinthal and March, 1981; March, 1976; 
Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
However, slack can also have negative implications for firms.  By its very 
nature, slack represents unused or ill-used resources (Leibenstein, 1969; 
Williamson, 1963, 1964) (also referred to as x-inefficiency in economics literature) 
(Leibenstein, 1969).  Additionally, slack typically results in loosened financial 
controls within firms and provides ready resources for managers to pursue their 
own self-interests, often at the expense of the best interests of their firms (Antle and 
Fellingham, 1990; Jensen, 1993; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leibenstein, 1969).  
Moreover, the presence of slack may keep doomed projects on “life support” that 
should otherwise have been shut down, simply because resources remain to 
continue the projects (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981).   
Despite the association between slack and search, in general, it is unclear 
whether slack promotes exploratory or exploitative search, specifically.  Some prior 
work has found that slack is positively related to activities associated with 
exploration, such as risk taking (Singh, 1986), adaptation (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001) 
and innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  Alternately, other work has found 
evidence that slack is related to activities associated with exploitation, such as 
incremental adaptation (Tan and Peng, 2003) and more cautious decision making 
(Mishina, Pollock, and Porac, 2004).   
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Voss, Sirdeshmukh and Voss (2008) attempted to gain greater clarity into 
the impact of slack on one specific type of outcome with which slack has been 
related – that of product innovation.  They found that slack had different effects on 
product innovation depending on the type of slack and the environmental context in 
which slack resource allocations were made. Yet even in that study, slack was not 
directly linked with search efforts.  While search efforts and innovation are 
certainly related, they are different outcomes, and they should each be given full 
attention and examination.  
While Voss and colleagues (2008) helped bring clarity to the question of the 
relationship between slack and product innovation, there remains substantial 
question regarding slack and search.  In terms of the impact of slack on innovation 
process in the pharmaceutical industry, firms first identify slack resources, engage 
in search behaviors to either discover new knowledge and technologies (i.e., 
exploration) or more fully utilize knowledge and technologies they already possess 
(i.e., exploitation), and develop inventions; ultimately such inventions are 
developed into marketable products (Gambardella, 1995; Gassmann, Reepmeyer, 
and Von Zedtwitz, 2004).  Thus, while the question of how slack affects product 
innovation has been answered with greater clarity, the question still remains as to 
how slack affects initial exploratory and exploitative search decisions of firms. 
Top Management Teams 
Thus far, I have discussed how firms react when they face problems and 
how they act (proactively) when slack resources are present.  Of course firms do not 
make decisions and take actions, but rather it is the people within firms who do so.  
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Specifically, it is one particular group of individuals within firms who make such 
choices – the top management team (TMT) (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Though 
influenced by forces such as the board of directors (Daily and Dalton, 1993; 
Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001) and the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977), the TMT is the group of individuals most directly responsible for strategy 
setting and execution within firms (Daily and Johnson, 1997; Daily and Schwenk, 
1996; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  These groups of individuals must scan and 
interpret environmental signals, develop strategic plans, work with boards of 
directors, implement strategic plans, be held accountable for their failure or success 
and, in the context of the present study, decide whether to engage in exploratory or 
exploitative search. 
The degree to which executives decide to engage in exploration or 
exploitation affects the fortunes of the firm and their personal wealth as well.  As 
mentioned previously, the returns from exploration and exploitation are rather 
varied (March, 1991).  The financial outcomes of exploration are frequently 
“uncertain, distant, and often negative,” but when they do result in positive 
outcomes, they can be extremely positive; in contrast, exploitation generally results 
in more “positive, proximate, and predictable” returns (March, 1991: 85).  
Depending on the risk preferences of these executives, then, the typical outcomes 
from exploration and exploitation may hold very different appeal.   
Executives with high risk tolerance may be particularly attracted to the 
“swinging for the fences” prospects that exploration provides – the search effort 
often either pays off dramatically well or is a complete loss (Sanders and Hambrick, 
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2007).  Conversely, executives with low risk tolerance may be far more attracted to 
the “safe and steady” results that exploitation generally provides.  Owing to the 
tremendous influence that executives have within their firms and the very real 
differences that engaging in one form of search over the other generates, an 
important part of this dissertation is the examination of risk preferences of 
executives on exploratory and exploitative search. 
Upper Echelons Perspective 
The upper echelons (UE) perspective provides an appropriate theoretical 
lens through which to examine the influence of executives on search behaviors.  
The strategies ultimately decided upon by these executives are largely influenced by 
their underlying beliefs and the cognitive frames by which they view situations and 
decide upon strategies, as described by the UE perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984).  However, given the degree of difficulty in accessing and measuring these 
underlying psychological constructs, various demographic proxies such as age, 
tenure, functional background and education have been applied in diverse research 
settings (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders, 2004).  By measuring the proxies of 
other underlying psychological constructs such as risk preferences (e.g., Smith et 
al., 2005), creativity (e.g., Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007) and intelligence (e.g., 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), an impressive body of research has built a strong 
argument that demographic characteristics are reasonable proxies for the underlying 
constructs they purport to measure. 
The TMT demography studies frequently take the form of looking at how 
various demographic characteristics relate to outcomes of interest.  One of the 
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earliest studies in this regard was by Murray (1989) who looked at TMT 
demographic heterogeneity and performance.  He found partial support for the 
assertion that in more stable environments, TMTs with more homogeneity (in terms 
of age, tenure, functional background and education) would perform better and in 
less stable environments, more diverse groups would perform better.  Using a 
similar approach, Bantel and Jackson (1989) discovered that the more diversity 
among TMT members, the more unique (i.e., “innovative”) solutions they found.   
Building on studies such as these, Pegels et al (2000) looked at TMT age, 
tenure, education level and functional background and found that the closer the 
demographic characteristics of firms resembled those of the strongest performers in 
an industry, the better they did.  Additionally, Amason, Shrader and Tompson 
(2006) found that the better a TMT demographic profile fit the novelty of a venture, 
the better it would do – more homogenous TMTs were better suited for less novel 
ventures and more heterogeneous TMTs were better suited for more novel ventures. 
Scholars investigating these issues have found relationships between 
demographic characteristics and underlying psychological constructs in terms of 
average levels as well as heterogeneity of characteristics (e.g., Carpenter et al., 
2004; Tihanyi et al., 2000).  Numerous studies have examined demographic 
characteristics in this regard and have looked at various issues influenced by TMT 
size, tenure, education level, education specialization, functional background, age 
and compensation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Boone 
et al., 2004; Bunderson, 2003; Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 
Cho, and Chen, 1996; Kor, 2006; Murray, 1989; Pegels et al., 2000; Rajagopalan 
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and Datta, 1996; Simons, Pelled, and Smith, 1999; Tihanyi et al., 2000; Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1992; Wiersema and Bird, 1993).   
Despite the extensive body of work surrounding demographic research, it is 
not without its critics (Priem, Lyon, and Dess, 1999).  Due to the coarse nature of 
demographic measures, scholars have argued that some measures are not 
necessarily accurate measures of the constructs they purport to examine (Lawrence, 
1997; Pettigrew, 1992; Priem et al., 1999).  However, their use can be appropriate if 
the measures are valid proxies of the underlying constructs they purport to 
represent.  In this dissertation, I use executive age and compensation as indicators 
of executive risk preferences and discuss the appropriateness and applicability of 
each measure in the following sections.   
Executive Age 
Age as a proxy for risk preferences has the support of sound theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings, making its use in demography studies justified.  
Theorists argue that as executives age, they may have an increasingly difficult time 
grasping new concepts and ideas (Chown, 1960; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
because of the decreased stamina and physical and mental abilities required for the 
changes that often result from new ideas (Child, 1974).  Additionally, executives 
may become more risk averse as they age because, if the risks do not pay off and 
they are terminated from their positions, they may have a harder time obtaining a 
comparable position than younger executives (Eriksson, 1991; Ward, Sonnenfeld, 
and Kimberly, 1995).  Along these lines, executives may also feel that there is little 
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to look forward to after their career is over and may want to minimize risks of 
prematurely ending it (Sonnenfeld, 1988).   
Empirical studies have added support to these theoretical reasons, as prior 
work has found that as executives age they tend to be more risk averse, in general 
(MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986), and tend to minimize investments in risky, 
long-term projects, the results of which they may not be around to reap (Barker III 
and Mueller, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 1991).  Concurrent with the decrease in 
time and resources allocated towards long-term projects, executives often spend 
more time focused on manipulating short-term earnings (Davidson, Xie, and Ning, 
2007) and pursuing more low-growth strategies (Child, 1974).  Indeed, in reviewing 
the theoretical and empirical evidence it seems clear that “one of the most enduring 
findings about executive age is that older executives tend to be more conservative” 
(Barker III and Mueller, 2004: 785).   
Age: Average and Heterogeneity  
Because of its strong theoretical and empirical support, executive age has 
been a frequently examined variable, examined by examining both the average age 
and heterogeneity of ages among executives.  The average age of executives has 
been studied in terms of innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), project 
performance (Katz, 1982), firm performance (Pegels et al., 2000) and international 
diversification (Tihanyi et al., 2000).  In addition to executive age as a reflection of 
risk preferences, executive compensation has long been studied due to the effect 
that compensation has on executive risk preferences.  
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Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation has been studied in terms of its influence on 
aligning risk preferences between principals and agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Because shareholders have better ability to diversify 
their wealth among firms with varying levels of risk, they are more risk neutral with 
respect to the risk level of any one firm within their portfolios (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992).  Managers, however, have a great deal of personal wealth (e.g., 
employment, salary, stock, etc.) tied up within firms and are, therefore, assumed to 
be risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Because of this difference in risk 
preferences, much research has investigated how to properly structure 
compensation systems to align the risk preferences of the agents with the principals.  
However, because of the human capital that executives have invested in firms, and 
the inability to diversify the risk associated with such an investment, it is nearly 
impossible to achieve perfect alignment between principals and agents (Holmstrom, 
1979). 
Compensation scholars have examined the relationship between 
compensation and various outcomes.  Examples of some research includes the 
relationship between compensation and R&D spending (Wu and Tu, 2007), 
innovation (Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000; Yanadori and Marler, 
2006), competitive behaviors (Vroom, 2006), technological intensiveness (Siegel 
and Hambrick, 2005), performance (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005; Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1994), monitoring and control (Beatty and Zajac, 1994b) and the capital 
structure of firms (John and John, 1993).   
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Regarding R&D spending, Wu and Tu (2007) found that stock option pay is 
a significant predictor of R&D spending and is even more effective when (absorbed 
and unabsorbed) slack resources are high or when performance is high.  Balkin, 
Markman and Gomez-Mejia (2000) examined whether CEO compensation was 
based on the level of innovation (i.e., patents and R&D spending) and found that it 
was, with short-term compensation being a stronger predictor than long-term 
compensation.  Similarly, Yanadori and Marler (2006) looked at the compensation 
policies that high-tech firms put in place for mid-level R&D managers and found 
that the desire of firms to pursue innovation resulted in a) higher compensation for 
R&D employees (as compared with non-R&D employees); b) more long-term 
compensation for R&D employees (as opposed to short-term pay); and c) a longer 
vesting period of stock options for R&D employees.  These findings build strong 
support for the arguments that compensation affects R&D and innovation.  
However, research is lacking on the link between TMT compensation and 
the kind of search (exploratory, exploitative) firms seek and the type of 
compensation that yields such results.  For example, when stock options (one form 
of long-term compensation) are extremely out-of-the-money (OOTM), executives 
tend to be more risk seeking, but when they are extremely deep-in-the-money 
(DITM), executives are more risk averse (Carpenter, 2000).  Devers and colleagues 
(2007) argue that because of how different compensation systems differentially 
influence executive behaviors, they should be studied in more detail than they have 
previously been examined.  I seek to answer the call for a more detailed 
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examination of how different compensation components influence exploratory and 
exploitative search. 
Hypotheses 
Problem-Based Search 
Attempts to Search for Solutions 
 As stated previously, when firms encounter problems, they engage in search 
efforts to correct those problems (Cyert and March, 1963).  As modeled in this 
study, problemistic search is examined in terms of financial performance below 
aspiration levels.  Thus, when executives view their firms’ financial performance to 
be below aspiration levels, they seek to engage in search efforts to remedy such 
shortcomings (Greve, 2003).  However, in what type of search efforts would they 
engage (i.e., exploratory or exploitative) to solve the financial problems?  Prospect 
theory addresses this question.   
According to prospect theory, when individuals perceive themselves to be 
operating from a “loss” perspective, they become more risk seeking to make up for 
the losses they have incurred (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  In the present 
situation, when executives view their firms to be in a loss situation, they would 
become more risk seeking in the search efforts that they support in their firms.  
Owing to the uncertain nature of exploratory search, exploration is considered more 
risky than exploitation (He and Wong, 2004; March, 1991).  Thus, when the 
financial performance level of firms is below that of their aspired level, they will 
engage in a greater level of exploratory search (c.f., Greve, 2007).  By engaging in 
more exploratory search, they seek to discover new knowledge or technology that 
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would enable them to make a substantial breakthrough and reap large financial 
returns (He and Wong, 2004).  By taking such risks, they would hope to overcome 
the loss situation.   
By the same argument, then, since the returns from exploitation are typically 
more consistent but more conservative (He and Wong, 2004), engaging in 
exploitative search does not hold the same promise of recuperating losses that 
exploratory search does.  When viewed from the loss perspective, generating small, 
consistent returns via exploitative search will not contribute towards getting firms 
out of their financial distress.  Therefore, when firms experience greater financial 
performance short of their aspiration levels, they will engage in less exploitative 
search.  Formally: 
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between performance below 
the aspiration level and exploratory search; as performance below the 
aspiration level increases, exploratory search increases. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative association between performance below 
the aspiration level and exploitative search; as performance below the 
aspiration level increases, exploitative search decreases.  
Slack Search 
 In addition to problem-motivated search, when firms do not face 
performance shortfalls, they may still be motivated to search. This may be so when 
firms possess stores of slack resources.  Firms can use these slack resources to 
engage in search activities that they might not otherwise be able to pursue (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Greve, 2003).   
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As discussed above, while recent work (e.g., Greve, 2007; Voss et al., 2008) 
brought clarity to issues surrounding the relationship between slack and product 
innovation, questions still remain as to the relationship between slack and 
organizational search.  Search is a crucial first step in the innovation cycle, 
deserving a separate investigation.  Financial slack resources, whether they be 
available, potential or recoverable represent resources that can be deployed or re-
deployed within firms if and when desired, although they vary in their ease of 
(re)deployment.   
Available slack (measured as the firm’s quick ratio) represents the most 
easily deployable type of slack resource, since it is not tied to any specific projects 
(Bourgeios and Singh, 1983).  Potential slack (measured as the firm’s debt-to-equity 
ratio) is the next most easily deployable type since once acquired, potential slack 
becomes available slack and can then be deployed (e.g., Dierickx and Cool, 1989).  
Recoverable slack (SG&A-to-sales ratio) is the least easily deployable type since it 
is embedded within current operations and is not typically accessed except when 
other slack resources are unavailable, such as during times of financial hardship 
(Bourgeios, 1981).   
However, despite the differences in the ease with which each type of 
financial slack resource can be (re)deployed, the basic argument for each remains 
the same.  As financial slack resources increase, the structural constraints placed 
upon the use of those resources decreases (Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Voss et al., 
2008).  These looser constraints will be associated with a decreasing concern of 
hoarding resources (since they are increasingly plentiful) and greater gain seeking 
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and risk taking (Voss et al., 2008).  The characteristic of greater risk taking suggests 
an increase in exploratory activities, consistent with prior research (Mishina et al., 
2004; Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Tan and Peng, 2003; Voss et al., 2008). 
Alternately, as slack decreases, structural controls will tighten and there will 
be an increased focus on making sure the projects to which resources are allocated 
are worthwhile (Voss et al., 2008).  This focus will likely be associated with a 
decreased focus on gain seeking and risk taking, instead favoring more reliable 
returns from investments (He and Wong, 2004; March, 1991).  These characteristics 
suggest a tendency to favor more exploitative search.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive association between each type of 
financial slack resource (available, potential and recoverable) and 
exploratory search; as slack increases, exploratory search increases. 
Hypothesis 2b: There is a negative association between each type of 
financial slack resource (available, potential and recoverable) and 
exploitative search; as slack decreases, exploitative search increases. 
TMT Age and Search 
 The top management team of a firm is largely responsible for directing the 
search efforts of firms.  These individuals make strategic decisions for firms with 
imperfect information and with bounded rationality (Cyert and March 1963)  Thus, 
individual differences of these executives are important to examine when 
attempting to understand what drives their strategic choices (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984) and by implication, the specifics of search.  The types and extent of search 
efforts ultimately decided upon by these executives are largely influenced by their 
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underlying beliefs and cognitive frames by which they view situations (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984).   
However, given the degree of difficulty in accessing and measuring these 
underlying psychological constructs, various demographic proxies such as age, 
tenure, functional background and education have been applied in diverse research 
settings (Carpenter et al., 2004).  By measuring the proxies of other underlying 
psychological constructs such as risk preferences (e.g., Smith et al., 2005), 
creativity (e.g., Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007) and intelligence (e.g., Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992), scholars have built strong arguments that demographic 
characteristics are reasonable proxies for the underlying constructs they purport to 
measure, as previously discussed.   
One such underlying construct is that of executive risk tolerance.  O’Brien 
(under review) notes that the impact of firm age on risk taking has been previously 
examined (Beatty and Zajac, 1994a; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Jegers, 1991; 
Singh, 1986), with some other work examining how factors such as organizational 
slack and aspiration levels moderate such relationship (Bromiley, 1991; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Miller and Leiblein, 1996).   
One common argument regarding firm age and risk preferences is that as 
executives age, they become less flexible in their cognitive patterns and 
increasingly resistant to change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  As executives age, 
their career window decreases, discouraging them from pursuing risky strategies 
(Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970).  Instead, job and financial security increase in 
importance which places a stronger focus on maintaining the status quo and 
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minimizing risky strategies (Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970; Vroom and Pahl, 1971).  
All this suggests that older executives are more likely to be risk averse, while 
younger executives are more likely to be risk seeking. 
Risk preferences are related to organizational search in that different kinds 
of search are associated with different risk levels in terms of length of payoff and 
amount of payoff.  As discussed previously, searching externally is generally 
regarded as more risky, given the longer time horizon and relative uncertainty in 
generating returns (March, 1991).  In contrast, searching internally to more fully 
develop existing knowledge generally has a shorter time horizon and returns from 
such search efforts are much more likely to result in a payoff (March, 1991).  Even 
though returns from internal exploitative search are typically less than those 
generated from external exploratory search, they are more consistent and hence, 
considered less risky.  Thus, when considering age as a proxy for risk preferences 
and its implication for search preferences, we argue that older executives favor 
internal, exploitative search while younger executives favor external, exploratory 
search.  Due to expected limitations in the data, I will likely only be able to 
consistently gather age data on CEOs.   
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a negative association between CEO age and 
exploratory search; as CEO age increases, exploratory search will 
decrease.   
Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive association between CEO age and 
exploitative search; as CEO age increases, exploitative search will increase. 
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Compensation 
 This dissertation is concerned with what influences firm search efforts.  As I 
have previously discussed, executives largely determine the search efforts in which 
firms will engage.  Thus, it is important to examine the motivations and preferences 
of executives that influence the types of search efforts they direct their firms 
towards.  I look at executive age and compensation as two core components that 
drive firm search efforts.  While age is highly personal to executives and not subject 
to manipulation (except for determining the beginning and ending points of 
executive tenure), compensation is subject to manipulation. 
Executive compensation typically consists of two components: short-term 
pay and long-term pay (Westphal and Zajac, 1994).  Short-term pay is comprised of 
the executives’ base salary and bonuses tied to short-term performance goals 
(Balkin et al., 2000).  In contrast, executive long-term pay is comprised of equity-
based components such as stock options and other instruments that are linked to a 
longer term (e.g., three-to-five year) window (Balkin et al., 2000).   
 Agency theory argues that executives with high levels of short-term pay 
(relative to long-term pay) will be more interested in maximizing the value of the 
firm in the short-term in order to maximize their personal wealth (Demirag, 1998).  
Other factors held constant, when executives with high ratios of short-term 
compensation decide how to allocate scarce resources, they typically invest in 
projects that have a greater likelihood of paying off in the short-term.  In terms of 
search efforts, executives with a short-term focus typically promote internal search, 
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exploiting competencies already known.  This type of search is associated with 
higher likelihood of success, even if the eventual payoff may be less (March, 1991).   
 In contrast, executives with higher levels of long-term compensation 
(relative to short-term compensation) will be more focused in maximizing the value 
of the firm in the long-term to maximize their long-term wealth (c.f., Demirag, 
1998).  Again, when such executives must allocate scarce resources between short-
term and long-term projects, I argue that those executive groups with higher levels 
of long-term pay will promote long-term projects.  In conducting search efforts, 
executives with this long-term focus would typically favor external search, 
exploring for new information that the firm did not previously possess.  Focusing 
on such projects is associated with higher risk, but higher variance of returns.  With 
a higher level of long-term pay, then, executives would be willing to bear additional 
risk with the hope of increasing their future payoff. 
As with age, compensation can differ not only on average type, but on the 
variance of pay among the executive members.  Pay disparity has been linked with 
negative consequences such as a failure to work together and lower levels of 
innovation, due to power struggles and conflict stemming from disparate pay 
structures (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005).  Thus, at higher levels of pay heterogeneity 
(disparity), exploratory search will decrease, while at lower levels of pay 
heterogeneity, exploitative search will increase. 
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These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
Short-term compensation disparity: 
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative association between short-term 
compensation disparity and exploratory search; as the short-term 
compensation disparity increases, exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 4b: There is a positive association between short-term 
compensation disparity and exploitative search; as the short-term 
compensation disparity increases, exploitative search will increase. 
Long-term compensation disparity: 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a negative association between long-term 
compensation disparity and exploratory search; as the long-term 
compensation disparity increases, exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a positive association between long-term 
compensation disparity and exploitative search; as the long-term 
compensation disparity increases, exploitative search will increase. 
CEO short-term compensation ratio: 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a negative association between CEO short-term 
compensation ratio and exploratory search; as CEO short-term 
compensation ratio increases, exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 6b: There is a positive association between CEO short-term 
compensation ratio and exploitative search; as CEO short-term 
compensation ratio increases, exploitative search will increase. 
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TMT short-term compensation ratio: 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a negative association between TMT short-term 
compensation ratio and exploratory search; as TMT short-term 
compensation ratio increases, exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 7b: There is a positive association between TMT short-term 
compensation ratio and exploitative search; as TMT short-term 
compensation ratio increases, exploitative search will increase. 
Ownership 
In addition to age and compensation, the amount of equity executives have 
in their firms has been found to have an impact on risk preferences (Sanders, 2001) 
(Devers et al., 2008).  Agency theory based arguments had long held that to the 
degree that the interests of executives and owners can be aligned, that executives 
will act in the best interest of owners (Berle Jr. and Means, 1932; Fama, 1980).  
Accordingly, the more of the firm that executives own (primarily in the form of 
stock ownership), the more they will take actions consistent with owners’ desires to 
grow the value of the firm.   
Typically, owners of firms support risk-taking measures that, while costly in 
the short-term, will increase the long-term value of the firm (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 
2002).  Recent research has found support for the idea that increasing equity 
ownership (firm risk) interacts with the risk of job loss (employment risk) to 
magnify risk aversion within executives.  This effect actually influences executives 
to take more cautious approaches to risk taking behaviors so as to not lose the value 
of their stock equity and possibly their job, because of a few bad decisions.  Thus, 
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executives with greater stock ownership will be more conservative, while 
executives with lower levels of stock ownership will be more aggressive in their 
risk behaviors.  Accordingly: 
CEO Stock Ownership: 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a negative association between CEO equity 
ownership and exploratory search; as CEO equity ownership increases, 
exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 8b: There is a positive association between CEO equity 
ownership and exploitative search; as CEO equity ownership increases, 
exploitative search will increase. 
TMT Stock Ownership: 
Hypothesis 9a: There is a negative association between TMT equity 
ownership and exploratory search; as TMT equity ownership increases, 
exploratory search will decrease. 
Hypothesis 9b: There is a positive association between TMT equity 
ownership and exploitative search; as TMT equity ownership increases, 
exploitative search will increase. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Inclusion Requirements 
 To test these hypotheses, I examined a sample of U.S.-based, publicly traded 
firms within the pharmaceutical industry from 1994 to 2005.  In order to provide a 
strong test for the theory and hypotheses developed herein, I needed to test the 
hypotheses in an industry in which the search efforts of firms could be documented 
in a clear and consistent manner.  Additionally, I needed access to demographic and 
compensation data of top executives of these firms in which search happened.  The 
pharmaceutical industry proved to be just such an industry.   
Regarding the first requirement, the search efforts of pharmaceutical firms 
are documented extensively through patenting (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2001, 2002; 
Nerkar and Roberts, 2004).  Patenting is not, in and of itself, organizational search.  
However, more so than in any other industry, patenting is an accurate reflection of 
knowledge search by firms (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996). 
As to the second requirement, in order to determine the influences of 
demographic characteristics and compensation on firms’ search efforts, I utilized 
only publicly traded firms.  Patenting rights vary by nation depending on the 
intellectual property laws in place.  In the United States, the intellectual property 
rights are stable and supportive of protecting the patent holders’ rights, thus 
encouraging patenting.  Thus, because I focused on U.S.-based firms (and patents 
applied for in the United States), I captured patent data in an industry and country in 
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which patenting is extremely important and the benefits of which are legally 
protected. 
Generalizability 
Despite the appropriateness of using the pharmaceutical industry to examine 
the search efforts of firms and performance outcomes from such search, as with any 
single industry study, there were questions of generalizability.  Mansfield (1986) 
estimated that, in the pharmaceutical industry, 60 percent of inventions would not 
have developed but for patent protection.1  This suggests that while patenting 
activity does not account for all of the searching in which firms engage it accounts 
for a substantial portion.  More importantly, the evidence contained within patent 
applications regarding the tendency of firms to explore or exploit is an indication of 
their search tendencies even when the search efforts are not formalized in patent 
applications.   Thus, to the extent that patent applications serve as a reflection of the 
broader search behaviors of firms, the findings in this study are generalizable to 
other industries. 
Final Sample Composition 
 Consistent with prior work utilizing the pharmaceutical industry, the sample 
consisted of United States-based, publicly traded firms that were classified as 
belonging to the pharmaceutical industry (SIC 2834 or NAICS 325412) (Bierly and 
Chakrabarti, 1996; Miller, 2008).  To make sure the firms were actively and 
primarily engaged in the pharmaceutical industry, only those firms whose 
                                                 
1 The percentage of inventions that would not have been developed but for patent protection for 
selected industries include: chemicals (38%); petroleum (25%); machinery (17%); fabricated metal 
products (12%); electrical equipment (11%) (Mansfield, 1986).  
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pharmaceutical sales accounted for more than half of their total sales were included 
(Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).  Additionally, it was important to distinguish 
between pharmaceutical firms that focused on selling prescription drugs (also 
referred to as ethical drugs) as opposed to those that primarily focused on selling 
generic drugs due to the patent protection afforded prescription drugs (Gassmann et 
al., 2004).   
Corporate Affiliations 
The Lexis-Nexis Corporate Affiliations (2002) directories were referenced 
to determine parent/subsidiary/affiliation information for each firm, for each year.  
Additionally, when reviewing patent data, occasionally patents would be affiliated 
with a firm but the Lexis-Nexis Corporate Affiliations directory did not have them 
referenced as being affiliated.  In such circumstances, I engaged in sufficient 
internet searches to determine if the firms were affiliated, the nature of their 
affiliation, and when their affiliation began.   
Research in the pharmaceutical industry has found that the length of time 
from the beginning of a project until initial patent application filing is 
approximately two years (Gassmann et al., 2004).  The general framework of my 
arguments is that certain firm and TMT characteristics in year 0 impact search 
behaviors that are documented in year 2.  Thus, when putting the sample together, 
patents by acquired firms were not included with the parents’ patents until 2 years 
after the acquisition.  This 2 year lag allows the effects I argue to be present long 
enough to manifest themselves.  
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Panel Data 
Panel data, rather than cross-sectional data, will be used in an attempt to 
capture the causal influence of problems, slack and TMT risk preferences on search.  
In the pharmaceutical drug industry, this was particularly important given the length 
and cost of research and development needed in order to apply for a patent 
(Gambardella, 1995; Gassmann et al., 2004).  From 1994-2003 there were 102 
unique firms that met all of the above criteria to be included in the sample: U.S. 
owned and based, publicly traded, primarily focused in the ethical drug 
pharmaceutical industry, with patent applications filed two years after the 
availability of financial information.  Collecting this data in an overlapping set of 
panels resulted in 449 firm-year observations.  Table 3.1 summarizes the panels of 
data I used and the time periods at which different variables were measured. 
Table 3.1 
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Dependent Variables 
Exploratory Search 
 I have argued that examining patent citation references in the pharma-
ceutical industry provides a window into the search efforts of firms.  That is, to the 
degree that firms incorporate new citations in their patent applications, it reflects 
their efforts in exploring for, and incorporating, new knowledge.  On the other 
hand, to the degree that firms repeatedly use the same citations reflects the fact that 
they are exploiting currently held knowledge.  To measure the degree to which 
firms incorporate new citations (exploration) or reuse the same citations 
(exploitation), I used the operationalization developed by Katila and Ahuja (2002), 
and I defer to their original work for a more thorough description of the 
development of the variables.   
To measure the degree to which firms engage in exploration, I utilized the 
variable exploratory search.  Exploratory search is defined as “the proportion of 
previously unused citations (new citations it-1) in a firm’s focal year’s list of 
citations” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002: 1186).  A high exploratory search score 
indicates that firms are utilizing a large number of previously unused patent 
citations, which reflects their efforts in exploring for and incorporating new 
knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001).   
Conversely, a low exploratory search score indicates that firms have focused 
their search efforts to a more narrow body of knowledge.  Argote (1999) argued that 
the organizational memory of firms in high technology industries (such as 
pharmaceuticals) tends to be somewhat short-term, such that knowledge that has not 
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been used within approximately five years is effectively forgotten (Argote, 1999).  
Thus, as did Katila and Ahuja (2002), I counted the number of citations referenced 
in each patent application that were not included in any other patent applications by 
a given firm in the preceding five years.  This formula is formally stated as: 
Exploratory Search  i t-1 = ( new citations i t-1 / total citations i t-1 ). 
Exploitative Search 
 While exploratory search reflects the degree to which firms have 
incorporated new knowledge as part of their search efforts, exploitative search 
reflects the degree to which firms have reused existing knowledge in their search 
efforts.  The more firms reuse a technology, the better acquainted they become with 
it (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  As with exploratory search, I utilized the measure for 
exploitative search from that put forth by Katila and Ahuja (2002).  Exploitative 
search is “measured as the average number of times a firm repeatedly used the 
citations in the patents it applied for” (Katila and Ahuja, 2002: 1187).   
A high value for exploitative search indicates that firms have frequently 
used a given set of citations in prior patent applications, while a low value indicates 
they have not made frequent use of such citations in prior applications.2  
Exploitative search is calculated by taking “the number of items that, on the 
average, each citation in the year t-1 was repeatedly used during the past five years” 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002: 1187).  Formally stated:  
                      t-2 
Exploitative Search  it-1 = (     Σ   repetition count iy / total citations i t-1 ). 
                   y=t-6 
                                                 
2 One alternate explanation for a low exploitative search value is that the firm has not applied for 
many prior patents.  Thus, as discussed later, I control for prior patent applications. 
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 Patent and citation data was collected entirely from Delphion (a Thomson-
Reuters firm) (http://www.Delphion.com).    
Independent Variables 
Problem-Based Search 
 As previously discussed, of all of the different types of problems that firms 
can face (e.g., product recalls, increased competition, resource scarcity, inadequate 
legitimacy), the end result is that such problems ultimately result in financial 
difficulties.  Generally, problems related to financial performance can be described 
by firms failing to perform up to their desired level of performance (Chang, 1996; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Duncan and Weiss, 1979).  Greve (2003), following Cyert 
and March (1963: 123), examined the extent to which the actual performance of 
firms compares with their aspiration level.  I utilized Greve’s (2003: 691) 
formulation in this study and created the variable actual-to-aspired performance.  
The formulas by which to examine aspiration level in comparison with actual 
performance are: 
Ati  = a1SAti + (1 – a1)HAti. 
SA ti = ( Σ  P tj ) / (N – 1). 
    j≠i 
HAti  = a2 HAt-1, i + (1 – a2)P t-1. 
In these formulas, A is the aspiration level, which is a combination of social and 
historical aspiration levels.  SA is the social aspiration level, which is the average 
performance (P) of the other firms in the sample.  HA is the historical aspiration 
level, which is a combination of prior period historical aspiration level and the focal 
firm’s prior performance.  Overall, utilizing this measure for (under-)performance 
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incorporated performance in relation with peer firms, as well as historical and 
expected performance for the firm.  Prior research has supported the assertion that 
this measure is an appropriate one for examining financial problems that would 
induce firms to search for solutions. 
Slack-Based Search 
 As previously discussed, I examined the impact of three different types of 
financial slack on the search efforts of firms.  Available slack represents 
uncommitted resources that can be deployed at the discretion of executives and is 
represented by a firm’s quick ratio (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999).  Potential slack is 
the level of additional resources firms could appropriate from external sources if 
needed (Bourgeios and Singh, 1983).  This form is slack is represented by the 
firm’s ratio of debt-to-equity (Bourgeios and Singh, 1983; Bromiley, 1991; Hitt et 
al., 1991; Palmer and Wiseman, 1999).  The third aspect of slack that was examined 
is that of recoverable slack, which represents excess resources that can usually only 
be accessed when firms face adversity and must seek ways to reduce the budget.  
Recoverable slack is measured as the ratio of sales, general and administrative 
expenses, to sales (Bourgeios and Singh, 1983; Bromiley, 1991).  The data for the 
slack variables were obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
CEO Age 
 As argued previously, the importance of executive ages has been examined 
in various studies in terms of average age (e.g., Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Katz, 
1982; Pegels et al., 2000; Tihanyi et al., 2000).  Values for the variable CEO age 
were obtained from annual proxy statements. 
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TMT Compensation 
 Executive compensation is an important variable and has been used in 
studying various firm outcomes of interest, as discussed above (Balkin et al., 2000; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994b; John and John, 1993; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005; Tosi 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Vroom, 2006; Wu and Tu, 2007; Yanadori and Marler, 
2006).  Short-term compensation is comprised of annual salary and bonuses 
awarded to executives for a given year (Balkin et al., 2000).  Long-term 
compensation generally represents the equity component of executives’ pay and 
was calculated as twenty-five percent of the value of options awarded, which is 
consistent with recent research and yields similar results as that generated from the 
Black-Scholes options-pricing model (Balkin et al., 2000; Lambert, Larcker, and 
Weigelt, 1993).  The variable short-term ratio is the ratio of short-term 
compensation to total compensation, with total compensation being the sum of 
short-term and long-term compensation.   
I calculated two sets of variables for use from executive compensation: 
disparity of short-term and long-term salaries between the CEO and other TMT 
members, as well as a short-to-long term compensation ratio of the CEO and other 
TMT members.  The disparity variable will be the disparity of salaries between the 
CEO and the rest of the TMT members, for annual compensation (short-term 
disparity), as well as for long-term compensation (long-term disparity).  All 
executive compensation data were obtained from annual proxy statements filed by 
firms. 
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Equity Ownership 
 Equity ownership is another important variable that has been frequently 
examined by strategy scholars for its impact on executive risk preferences (Devers 
et al., 2008).  Equity ownership was calculated for CEOs and TMTs as the ratio of 
common stock each executive owns to all outstanding common stock of the firm to 
create the variables CEO equity and TMT equity.  Stock ownership data were 
gathered from annual proxy statements filed by firms. 
Control Variables 
Firm size 
 Owing to their larger size and potentially larger resource base, large firms 
frequently have the ability to engage in more R&D, and size is frequently controlled 
for in studies that include patents and/or innovation (Cohen and Klepper, 1996).  It 
was particularly important to control for firm size given the rather mixed findings 
related to the relationship between size and factors generally related to search 
efforts (e.g., innovation, invention, R&D).  Some of the divergent research includes 
findings that R&D expenditures do not increase proportionally as firms grow 
(Fritsch and Meschede, 2001), and that innovativeness tends to decrease as firms 
grow (Chandy and Tellis, 2000), that larger firms can spread the costs of R&D 
across a broader research platform (Cohen and Klepper, 1996) but that the impact 
of each patent tends to decrease in larger firms (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000).   
Size is commonly operationalized as sales or assets.  Given that some of the 
firms in the sample were quite small and given how long it takes to bring products 
to market in this industry, assets was deemed a more appropriate measure of size 
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than sales, so assets is utilized herein.  Additionally, given the disparity in size of 
many of the firms, the log of assets is typically used instead of the raw value.  Data 
transformations are discussed below in Chapter Four. 
Prior Patenting Propensity 
In addition to their size, firms differed in their patenting propensity.  While 
larger firms tend to patent more, they are not required to do so.  Likewise, smaller 
firms may engage in a disproportionately high level of patenting, given their size.  
Because of this uncertainty and potential disparity in the amount of patenting, I 
controlled for the total number of patents for which firms applied in the prior five 
years with the variable prior patents.  Again, due to the wide range of number of 
patents, I took the log of prior patents. 
R&D Intensity 
Complementing prior patenting propensity (the “output” of invention 
efforts), I also controlled for the “input,” which is the amount of resources firms 
allocate towards their search efforts (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  I have previously 
argued that the history of citations used in firms’ patenting activities in the 
pharmaceutical industry represents a high proportion of the search efforts of firms.  
While this may be the case, there are still some general search efforts of firms that 
are not reflected in patent applications.  Thus, by controlling for R&D intensity, I 
control for such additional search efforts and create a more conservative test of my 
hypotheses.  R&D intensity was calculated as R&D expenditures divided by sales. 
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Capital Structure 
 Owing to the theoretical arguments that financial returns from exploration 
are distant and uncertain, while returns from exploitation are proximate and more 
certain, the overall financial position of firms may influence the type of search in 
which firms engage (March, 1991; Miller and Bromily, 1990).  Accordingly, I 
accounted for this possibility by controlling for the capital structure of firms (i.e., 
total assets / total shareholders’ equity), with the variable capital structure. 
TMT Size 
 The size of TMTs has been linked with various outcomes (Carpenter et al., 
2004).  Because of this, Carpenter and colleagues (Carpenter et al., 2004) argued 
that any study involving top management teams ought to include the size of the 
TMT as a control variable.  Accordingly, I included TMT size as a control. 
Growth Opportunities 
 The growth opportunity of firms is also a common control variable, and 
Tobin’s Q is a frequently used measure for it.  Tobin’s Q is a measure of “the ratio 
of a firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets” (Barney, 2007).  
Firms with values above 1 are performing well and those below 1 are not 
performing as well.  There are many ways to calculate Tobin’s Q.  Per Barney 
(Barney, 2007), I calculated the variable Tobin’s Q as : 
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Firm Market Value  
[market value of common stock + market value of preferred stock +  
book value of short-term debt + book value of long-term debt] 
____________________________________________________________ 
Book Value of Total Assets 
Citations 
Because I solved for two dependent variables at the same time (exploratory 
and exploitative search), I needed to include instrumental variables for each of the 
DVs in the equations.  The number of unique citations (cites) a firm used should be 
related to exploratory search, but not as strongly related to exploitative search.  
Likewise, the number of cites a firm has repeatedly used should be related to 
exploitative search, but not as strongly related to exploratory search.  Thus, the 
variables unique cites and repeated cites were included as instrumental variables for 
exploratory search and exploitative search, respectively.  A summary list of 
variables is included below in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 
Variables for Study
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT SOURCE
Exploratory Search
The degree to which firms cite patents which they have 
not cited in other patent applications in the preceding five 
years Delphion
Exploitative Search
The average number of times that each citation was 
repeatedly used in the prior five years Delphion  
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Table 3.2 (cont’d) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT SOURCE
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance
Underperformance as a comparison of actual performance 
with aspiration level COMPUSTAT
Available slack Available slack is measured as the current ratio COMPUSTAT
Potential slack Potential slack is measured as the ratio of debt‐to‐equity COMPUSTAT
Recoverable slack
Recoverable salck is measured as the ratio of SG&A 
expenses to sales COMPUSTAT
CEO Age The present age of the CEO Proxy Statements
Short‐term disparity
The disparity between the CEO and other members of the 
TMT as to the level of short‐term compensation Proxy Statements
Long‐term disparity
The disparity between the CEO and other members of the 
TMT as to the level of long‐term compensation Proxy Statements
CEO short‐term ratio Ratio of short‐term to total compensation for the CEO Proxy Statements
TMT short‐term ratio
Average ratio of short‐term to total compensation for the 
other members of the TMT Proxy Statements
CEO equity
Ratio of common stock owned by the CEO to all 
outstanding common stock of the firm Proxy Statements
TMT equity
Average ratio of common stock owned by the TMT to all 
outstanding common stock of the firm Proxy Statements
CONTROL VARIABLES MEASUREMENT SOURCE
Firm size Firm assets COMPUSTAT
Prior patents Total patent applications filed in the previous 5 years Delphion
R&D intensity R&D expenditures / sales COMPUSTAT
Capital structure  Total assets / total shareholders equity COMPUSTAT
TMT Size Number of TMT members included per firm‐year Proxy Statements
Tobin's Q
Firm market value [market value of common stock + 
market value of preferred stock + book value of short‐term 
debt + book value of long‐term debt] / Book value of total 
assets
Proxy Statemetns 
and COMPUSTAT
Repeated Cites The number of repeated citations in the last 5 years Delphion  
Unique Cites The number of unique citations in the last 5 years Delphion  
 
Analytical Approach 
 As previously discussed, I examined the U.S.-based, publicly traded firms 
from the pharmaceutical industry.  These 102 firms were examined (subject to the 
number of panels in which they were included) from the period 1994 to 2005, 
53 
 
which resulted in a total sample of 449 firm-year observations.  Relationships that 
are observable over time are not generally discernable in a one-year window.  
However, longitudinal data allows for a better examination of causal relationships 
(Bergh, 1993).  Because this study attempts to examine the causal relationships 
between variables, a longitudinal panel data set was most appropriate.   
 Analyzing longitudinal data using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
was used for a long time by scholars examining longitudinal data sets.  However, 
researchers had to test and correct for heteroskedasticity (non-constant variance of 
error terms) and autocorrelation (when the covariance between error terms is not 
equal to zero) when using OLS regression (Bergh, 1993).  To increase the chances 
of avoiding these problems, an alternate analytical technique was required.   
Therefore, instead of OLS regression, fixed- or random-effects models are 
now typically used, with the difference between which modeling technique 
depending upon the type of data and goals of the research (Certo and Semadeni, 
2006).  Fixed-effects models are frequently used when the goal is generalization of 
the results to other firms that have the same values for key variables (e.g., number 
of patents, degree of exploration or exploitation).  However, random-effects models 
are usually used when the goal is generalization to other firms (or industries) that 
may differ on the values of key variables 
(http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IOA/newsom/mlrclass/ho_randfixd.doc). 
Hausman Specification Test 
However, beyond logical arguments for choosing between fixed- and 
random-effects  models, a Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) indicates 
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which test should be done.  The null hypotheses for the Hausman test is that the 
coefficients estimated by both the random and fixed effects estimators are the same 
(Park, 2005).  If the test is not significant, then random effects should be used.  If it 
is significant, then fixed effects should be used (Hausman, 1978; Park, 2005).  I ran 
the test twice, setting both exploratory search and exploitative search as the 
dependent variables, and in both cases, the test was significant.  Accordingly, fixed 
effects were used. 
Regression Models 
The .reg3 regression is a three-stage estimation technique, specifically 
designed to handle simultaneous equations.  This regression technique allows 
researchers to examine the impact of a set of independent variables upon two 
dependent variables at the same simultaneously 
(http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?reg3, Last Accessed June 9, 2009).  Since that is the 
present situation, .reg3 is an appropriate estimation tool.  This technique may be 
used for fixed-effects panel data by including the dummy variables for years, as I 
have done. 
For comparison sake, I also utilized the .xtivreg command which is 
specifically designed for handling panel data in which one or more “right-hand-
side” variables are endogenous variables (http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?xtivreg, 
Last Accessed June 9, 2009).  Endogenous variables were identified, along with the 
instrumental variable that was related with the endogenous variable but not related 
with the other endogenous variable(s).  This technique was modeled as fixed-effects 
with the “fe” option.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 After collecting the data in the manner discussed in Chapter Three, I 
analyzed the structure of the data to determine their appropriateness for testing my 
hypotheses.  After reviewing univariate statistics for the data and performing 
several transformations to decrease their non-normality, I analyzed the data using 
the .reg3 and .xtivreg techniques just discussed.  This chapter reports the results of 
the data structure examination and the hypotheses tests. 
 Before analyzing data with sophisticated analytical techniques, Hair et al. 
(1998) lay out four steps for initial data examination that provide the researcher an 
opportunity to first understand the data.  Those four steps include examinations of 
descriptive statistics and data distribution, checking for missing data, checking for 
outliers and testing the underlying assumptions of multivariate analysis (Hair Jr. et 
al., 1998).   
Descriptive Statistics 
The first step included an examination of the descriptive statistics, data 
distribution and correlation tables of all dependent, control and independent 
variables.  Reviewing the raw data in this fashion helps researchers gain a better 
understanding of the nature of the data and the degree to which they conform to 
normality.  Descriptive statistics are reported below in Table 4.1 and are discussed 
next. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Missing Variables 
Missing variables, skewness and kurtosis are of particular interest in initial 
examinations.  When a substantial number of variables are missing for a specific 
variable, the appropriateness of its use becomes questionable.  In the present case, 
Table 4.1 reveals that all of the variables except for available slack and CEO age 
are nearly fully present.  Compustat provided values for less than half of the 
observations for sales, general and administrative Expenses (the key variable in 
available slack), and the data did not appear to be present in 10-K reports.  Various 
methods exist for filling in values for missing values, such as imputation or mean-
substitution; however, each method has drawbacks.  In the present case, because 
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two other suitable measures for financial slack are present (potential slack and 
recoverable slack), I elected to simply drop available slack from the model.  
The only other variable with double-digit missing values is CEO age (the 
present age of CEOs of the firms).  However, at 432/449, this variable is only 
missing in 3.8% of the observations, so I took no corrective action with it.  Next, I 
examined the skewness and kurtosis of the data. 
Skewness 
The skewness of data represents the degree to which the data are bunched 
either towards or away from the y-axis of an x-y plot.  The normal range for 
skewness is approximately +/- 2 (Hair Jr. et al., 1998).  The (untransformed) data 
revealed that many variables were above this standard level.  In fact, many of these 
variables had skewness measuring above +/- 10, representing extremely skewed 
data.  As an example of the skewness of one of these variables, a graphical 
representation of CEO equity is provided below in Figure 4.1.   
Histograms with normal distribution overlays for all variables (before and 
after applicable transformations and outlier removal) in this study are included in 
Appendix A.  Additionally, plots of exploratory search with each other variable in 
this study and exploitative search with each other variable are included in  
Appendix B. 
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Figure 4.1 
 
While it is difficult to see due to the scale of the graph, the data were 
skewed so severely because of the high number of variables close to the “0” value 
and the presence of one value to the right of the “1.32” value.  Because this value 
may have represented an outlier, I examined it and discuss my findings below in the 
outlier examination section. 
Kurtosis 
Kurtosis, also of importance to examine at this stage, represents the degree 
of “peakedness” or “flatness” of the data and again, according to Hair Jr., et al. 
(1998), should be less than two.  Many of the variables in the data examined as part 
of this dissertation were extremely (positively) peaked.  Table 4.1, above, of CEO 
equity is also a good example of highly kurtotic data. 
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Data Transformations 
Applying appropriate transformations to data can minimize skewness and 
kurtosis – bringing the data within acceptable ranges – and allowing for accurate 
data analysis.  To correct for positively skewed data, Hair, Jr. et al. (1998) 
recommend taking the logarithm of skewed or kurtotic values, which I did.  Table 
4.2, below, shows the results of logarithmic transformations of appropriate 
variables.  
After applying these transformations (see Table 4.2 below), the skewness 
and kurtosis of all of the independent and control variables was reduced to 
acceptable levels except for that of capital structure which was still above 2 for both 
values.   
Table 4.2 
Full Panel Descriptive Statistics Prior after Transformation
Variable N N Missing Min Max Mean Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent Variables: 
Exploratory search 449 0 0.00 0.93 0.09 0.02 0.14 3.03 10.83
Exploitative search 449 0 0.00 0.97 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.65 ‐0.38
Independent Variables:
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (log) 308 141 ‐5.83 0.20 ‐1.51 0.84 0.92 ‐1.27 2.45
Available slack (log) 449 0 ‐1.36 3.61 1.40 1.01 1.00 ‐0.22 ‐0.76
Potential slack (log) 321 128 ‐10.48 4.73 ‐2.24 5.20 2.28 ‐0.39 0.68
CEO Age 432 17 34.00 73.00 53.06 43.42 6.59 ‐0.25 0.29
CEO short‐term ratio 449 0 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.07 0.27 ‐0.13 ‐1.03
TMT short‐term ratio 449 0 0.11 1.00 0.68 0.03 0.18 ‐0.30 ‐0.53
Short‐term disparity (log) 449 0 ‐12.07 2.03 0.48 0.85 0.92 ‐8.19 91.18
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) 449 0 0.00 7.44 0.91 0.66 0.81 1.79 9.00
CEO equity (log) 435 14 ‐13.67 0.30 ‐5.46 4.49 2.12 ‐0.45 0.19
TMT equity (log) 447 2 ‐12.49 0.57 ‐7.04 3.38 1.84 ‐0.01 0.33
(Theoretical) Control Variables:
Firm size (log) 449 0 ‐1.53 11.67 5.23 5.78 2.40 0.74 ‐0.13
R&D intensity (log) 445 4 ‐4.83 2.10 ‐1.46 0.86 0.93 ‐0.17 0.78
Capital structure (log) 426 23 0.02 4.83 0.57 0.38 0.61 2.88 13.37
Tobin's Q (log) 447 2 ‐0.86 3.71 1.44 0.37 0.61 0.27 1.38
TMT Size 449 0 3.00 8.00 4.73 0.66 0.81 ‐0.55 0.80
Repeated cites 409 40 0.00 9.58 5.08 5.69 2.38 ‐0.11 ‐0.95
Unique cites 422 27 0.00 7.59 3.22 3.53 1.88 0.32 ‐0.59
Prior patents 449 0 0.00 7.57 3.53 3.34 1.83 0.37 ‐0.70  
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However, upon closer inspection, the number of missing values dramatically 
increased for many variables.  Looking at the raw data, the presence of many 
negative and zero values was detected.  Such values are not capable of being log 
transformed.  Thus, a constant was added to those variables to bring the minimum 
value to 1and log transforms were re-run.  
 After applying constants and re-running the log transformations, there are 
two things of note.  First, short-term disparity had higher (worse) values after 
adding a constant and re-transforming than as originally examined.  As such, I 
reverted to the un-transformed values for that variable.  Second, most of the 
variables were close to the +/- 2 for skewness and kurtosis values, with potential 
slack, actual-to-aspired performance and capital structure as notable exceptions.  To 
try and get these three variables closer to normality, additional transformations were 
conducted. 
Square Root Transformation 
In addition to logarithmic transformations, square root transformations can 
be helpful.  As with log transformations, the addition of a constant was required to 
bring the lowest value to 1 so that all values would react the same way to a square-
root transform.  Specifically, this is because negative values cannot be squared, the 
values 1 and 0 remain constant, values above 1 become smaller and numbers below 
0 and 1 become larger (http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=8&n=6, Last accessed: 
June 2, 2009).     
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Inverse Transformation 
Additionally, inverse transformations were examined.  As with other 
transformations, inverse transforms (e.g., 1 / Y) also require the minimum value be 
brought up to 1 for consistent effects.  Without knowing which method would 
produce the best transformed results for potential slack, actual-to-aspired 
performance and capital structure, a series of transformations were undertaken and 
are presented below in Table 4.3 for easy comparison. 
Table 4.3 
Additional Transformations
Variable N N Missing Min Max Mean Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (log)
308 141 ‐5.83 0.20 ‐1.51 0.84 0.92 ‐1.27 2.45
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+log)
447 2 0.00 2.86 2.78 0.02 0.14 ‐19.20 391.42
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (log 
base 10)
447 2 0.00 1.24 1.21 0.00 0.06 ‐19.20 391.42
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+sq rt)
447 2 1.00 4.18 4.03 0.03 0.16 ‐15.94 300.02
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+inverse)
447 2 ‐1.00 ‐0.06 ‐0.06 0.00 0.04 ‐21.06 444.64
Capital structure 
(log)
426 23 0.02 4.83 0.57 0.38 0.61 2.88 13.37
Capital structure  449 0 0.00 5.16 3.91 0.05 0.21 ‐12.93 256.46
Capital structure (log 
base 10)
449 0 0.00 2.24 1.70 0.01 0.09 ‐12.93 256.46
Capital structure 
(constant+sq rt)
449 0 1.00 13.19 7.10 0.30 0.55 2.77 96.36
Capital structure 
(constant+inverse)
449 0 ‐1.00 ‐0.01 ‐0.02 0.00 0.05 ‐21.14 447.65
Potential Slack (log) 321 128 ‐10.48 4.73 ‐2.24 5.20 2.28 ‐0.39 0.68
Potential Slack 
(constant+log)
447 2 0.00 5.02 3.63 0.04 0.20 ‐11.54 235.45
Potential Slack (log 
base 10)
447 2 0.00 2.18 1.57 0.01 0.09 ‐11.54 235.45
Potential Slack 
(constant+sq rt)
447 2 1.00 12.28 6.15 0.25 0.50 4.85 113.16
Potential Slack 
(constant+inverse)
447 2 ‐1.00 ‐0.01 ‐0.03 0.00 0.05 ‐21.06 444.66
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For each of these variables, the transformation with the most appropriate 
skewness and kurtosis variables was only accomplished by dropping many negative 
and zero values.  Since negative and zero values are valid values, these log 
transforms were unacceptable.  The next best results in each case were those 
generated by the SQRT of the values.  However, those values were still rather high. 
Outlier Examination 
Because of the inability to bring the skewness and kurtosis values of 
potential slack, actual-to-aspired performance and capital structure within normal 
ranges, I examined the Z-scores of these values to scan for potential outliers.  The 
examination for outliers is an important step in data preparation as outliers have the 
potential to unduly influence the data.  A value may technically be considered an 
outlier if it is +/- 2.5 standard deviations away from the variable mean (Hair Jr. et 
al., 1998).  However, simply being +/- 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean 
is not sufficient evidence to remove a valid value.   
In addition to objective criteria, the value should be examined to determine 
why it appears to be an outlier.  For example, a firm that is substantially larger than 
other firms in the sample should not necessarily be removed from the sample 
simply because it is large.  However, a value reported in billions instead of millions 
(i.e., inaccurately reported data) should clearly be fixed or removed.  Generally, 
though, if the value causes undue influence on the rest of the data, perhaps a good 
case could be made for removal, but this should only be done in the most extreme 
circumstances (Hair Jr. et al., 1998). 
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For potential slack, there were 444 values between -3.62 and 3.95 standard 
deviations, 2 missing values and 3 extreme outliers of -10.37, +11.24, and +12.32.  
For actual-to-aspired performance, there were 446 values between -3.56 and +0.93 
standard deviations, 2 missing values and 1 extreme outlier of -19.10.  For the third 
variable, capital structure, there were 446 values between -3.61 and +4.03 standard 
deviations, 0 missing values and 3 extreme outliers of -12.19, +10.18 and +10.65. 
Digging deeper into the reasons for why these values were generated, I 
found that the same three firms were causing an undue influence on potential slack 
and capital structure: Columbia Laboratories (1999), Isis Pharmaceuticals (1999) 
and Sepracor (1998).  All three of these firms had low equity, low assets and high 
debt, creating a lethal combination on these calculated variables.  The other value, 
actual-to-aspired performance, was generated by Vyrex (1998) because of a 
particularly poor financial year and no prior year ROA to help smooth out the poor 
performance. 
In looking at the big picture of the dataset (449 firm-year observations), it 
seemed imprudent to allow four small firm-year observations with low assets, high 
debt and/or poor performance to have such a negative impact on two important 
independent variables and one important control variable.  Also, given that these 
extreme values were between 6.15 – 15.54 standard deviations away from the next 
closest value, it seemed quite reasonable to consider these values as outliers.  
Accordingly, I deleted these values and re-ran the above transformations for these 
three values, resulting in the next table, Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 
  Transformations of troublesome variables AFTER outlier removal
Variable N N Missing Min Max Mean Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance
446 3 ‐4.23 1.22 0.06 0.28 0.53 ‐3.26 19.18
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+log)
446 3 0.00 1.86 1.66 0.02 0.14 ‐6.80 68.03
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (log 
base 10)
446 3 0.00 0.81 0.72 0.00 0.06 ‐6.80 68.03
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+sq rt)
446 3 1.00 2.54 2.30 0.02 0.13 ‐4.69 36.37
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant+inverse)
446 3 ‐1.00 ‐0.16 ‐0.19 0.00 0.05 ‐12.08 170.48
Capital structure 448 1 ‐22.95 125.61 2.38 77.12 8.78 11.62 155.96
Capital structure 
(constant+log)
448 1 0.00 5.01 3.25 0.05 0.23 ‐4.84 105.07
Capital structure (log 
base 10)
448 1 0.00 2.17 1.41 0.01 0.10 ‐4.84 105.07
Capital structure 
(constant+sq rt)
448 1 1.00 12.23 5.10 0.35 0.59 6.73 92.22
Capital structure 
(constant+inverse)
448 1 ‐1.00 ‐0.01 ‐0.04 0.00 0.05 ‐20.23 420.11
Potential Slack 444 5 ‐18.57 28.39 0.23 5.01 2.24 2.33 77.28
Potential Slack 
(constant+log)
444 5 0.00 3.87 2.97 0.03 0.19 ‐11.34 169.35
Potential Slack (log 
base 10)
444 5 0.00 1.68 1.29 0.01 0.08 ‐11.34 169.35
Potential Slack 
(constant+sq rt)
444 5 1.00 6.93 4.44 0.08 0.28 ‐4.65 81.79
Potential Slack 
(constant+inverse)
444 5 ‐1.00 ‐0.02 ‐0.05 0.00 0.05 ‐18.81 371.40
 
After removing the outliers, two of the three variables (actual-to-aspired 
performance and potential slack) had the best results on the raw values for skewness 
and kurtosis – no manipulation was necessary beyond removing the outliers.  For 
the third variable, capital structure, a square-root transformation yielded the best 
results, with the fewest number of missing values.  Interestingly, however, doing 
this same procedure on the variable with outliers included actually resulted in lower 
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skewness but slightly higher kurtosis (2.77 and 96.36, respectively, compared with 
6.73 and 92.22).   
Because the data best resembled normality with the all observations for 
capital structure, removing a valid (even if extreme) value from capital structure did 
not seem warranted. However, the sacrifice of a few observations for actual-to-
aspired performance (Columbia 1998) and potential slack (Sepracor 1998, 
Columbia 1999 and Isis 1999), to achieve substantial improvement to the normality 
of the data, did appear justified.  Taking these steps resulted in the final descriptive 
statistics, shown below in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 
Final Full Panel Descriptive Statistics After Transformations
Variable N N Missing Min Max Mean Variance Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent Variables: 
Exploratory search (constant + 
log) 449 0 0.00 0.66 0.08 0.01 0.11 2.53 7.08
Exploitative search 449 0 0.00 0.97 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.65 ‐0.38
Independent Variables:
Actual‐to‐aspired performance 
(constant + sq rt) 446 3 ‐4.23 1.22 0.06 0.28 0.53 ‐3.26 19.18
Available slack (log) 449 0 ‐1.36 3.61 1.40 1.01 1.00 ‐0.22 ‐0.76
Potential slack (constant + sq rt) 444 5 ‐18.57 28.39 0.23 5.01 2.24 2.33 77.28
CEO Age 432 17 34.00 73.00 53.06 43.42 6.59 ‐0.25 0.29
CEO short‐term ratio 449 0 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.07 0.27 ‐0.13 ‐1.03
TMT short‐term ratio 449 0 0.11 1.00 0.68 0.03 0.18 ‐0.30 ‐0.53
Short‐term disparity 449 0 0.00 7.58 1.86 0.48 0.70 1.37 10.58
Long‐term disparity (constant + 
log) 449 0 0.00 7.44 0.91 0.66 0.81 1.79 9.00
CEO equity (log) 435 14 ‐13.67 0.30 ‐5.46 4.49 2.12 ‐0.45 0.19
TMT equity (log) 447 2 ‐12.49 0.57 ‐7.04 3.38 1.84 ‐0.01 0.33
(Theoretical) Control Variables:
Firm size (log) 449 0 ‐1.53 11.67 5.23 5.78 2.40 0.74 ‐0.13
R&D intensity (log) 445 4 ‐4.83 2.10 ‐1.46 0.86 0.93 ‐0.17 0.78
Capital structure (log) 448 1 1.00 12.23 5.10 0.35 0.59 6.73 92.22
Tobin's Q (log) 447 2 ‐0.86 3.71 1.44 0.37 0.61 0.27 1.38
TMT Size 449 0 3.00 8.00 4.73 0.66 0.81 ‐0.55 0.80
Repeated cites (constant + log) 449 0 0.00 9.58 4.67 7.00 2.65 ‐0.14 ‐0.99
Unique cites (constant + log) 449 0 0.00 7.59 3.14 3.51 1.87 0.37 ‐0.55
Prior patents (log) 449 0 0.00 7.57 3.53 3.34 1.83 0.37 ‐0.70  
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 Heteroskedasticity 
One of the key assumptions of regression, is that the residual terms have 
equal variance for all predicted values of the dependent variable(s), otherwise 
known as homoskedasticity (Cohen et al., 2003).  To test this assumption, I used the 
.hettest command in STATA.  This test sets the null hypotheses to be that the 
variables have constant variances.  With both exploratory and exploitative search as 
dependent variables, the test was significant (0.000), meaning that the null is 
rejected and suggesting that the data may be heteroskedastic (and not 
homoskedastic), violating one of the key assumptions of regression. 
As thoroughly discussed in the preceding pages, the structure of the data 
was extensively analyzed and numerous data transformations were performed.  It 
seemed unlikely that further transformations would result in changes substantial 
enough to remove heteroskedasticity.   
Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation, the degree to which panel data variables are correlated with 
themselves (Parr and Phillips, 1999) and multicollinearity, the degree to which 
variables are correlated with each other (Hair Jr. et al., 1998), were also important 
to examine.  I tested for autocorrelation in STATA with the command .findit 
xtserial.  The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation sets the null hypotheses to be that 
there is no first-order autocorrelation.  With exploitative search set as the dependent 
variable, the test was not significant (0.2774), indicating the null cannot be rejected, 
lending support to the assertion that there is no autocorrelation in that model.  
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However, with exploratory search set as the dependent variable, the test was 
significant (0.0000), indicating autocorrelation as related to the dependent variable. 
Collinearity 
Multicollinearity, a related issue, can be gauged, in part, by examining the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs), shown below in Table 4.6.  The VIFs indicate the 
amount that correlation amongst the predictor variables causes the variance of each 
regression coefficient to increase (Cohen et al., 2003).  Among all variables, firm 
size had the highest VIF, nearing a 10 – much higher than any other variable.  
Cohen et al. (2003) have said that when VIFs reach 10 or higher, serious 
multicollinearity may be present (423).  Yet even at levels as low as 2, variance 
inflation can cause instability in the data (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985).  
To gain a better understanding of whether the variance inflation and 
multicollinearity was causing instability in the data, I next examined the correlation 
matrix. 
Table 4.6 
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Firm size 9.6 0.104
Long‐term disparity 6.6 0.151
CEO short‐term ratio 6.5 0.153
Prior patents 4.7 0.213
Capital structure  4.3 0.231
Potential slack 4.3 0.231
R&D intensity 3 0.331
TMT short‐term ratio 2.5 0.396
Actual‐to‐aspired performance 2.3 0.435
Available slack 2 0.509
Short‐term disparity 1.6 0.630
CEO equity 1.5 0.657
Tobin's Q 1.4 0.709
TMT equity 1.3 0.746
TMT Size 1.3 0.756
CEO Age 1.3 0.793  
68 
 
To get a better picture of the degree of instability of the coefficients, I 
examined the correlation matrix for two items.  First, I made note of variables that 
seemed to be highly correlated with other variables in the correlation matrix, shown 
below in Table 4.7. 
The initial correlation table shows high, statistically significant correlations 
between many variables (correlations at .4 or higher are indicated in bold).  
Variables that are correlated with other variables at levels of .4 or higher are 
included in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 
 
The two variables that were highly correlated with the most number of other 
variables are firm size (assets) and prior patents (which could also be a reasonable 
proxy for firm size).  Given that the assets variable is included as a control for size, 
and that it is correlated with prior applications at .82 level, it may be unnecessary.
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Table 4.7 
Variable MEAN STD N
Explora‐ 
tory 
search
Exploit‐ 
ative 
search
Available 
slack
Potential 
slack
Actual‐to‐
aspired 
perf
CEO short‐
term ratio
TMT short‐
term ratio
Short‐term 
disparity
Exploratory 
search 0.080 0.112 449 1.000
Exploitative 
search 0.284 0.226 449 ‐0.329* 1.000
0.00
Available slack
1.395 1.005 449 0.004 0.1512* 1.000
0.94 0.00
Potential slack
0.227 2.237 444 ‐0.026 ‐0.058 0.005 1.000
0.59 0.22 0.93
Actual‐to‐
aspired 
performance 0.064 0.528 446 ‐0.085 0.045 0.108* 0.078 1.000
0.07 0.34 0.02 0.10
CEO short‐
term ratio 0.606 0.271 449 0.083 ‐0.033 0.102* ‐0.010 ‐0.222* 1.000
0.08 0.48 0.03 0.83 0.00
TMT short‐
term ratio 0.677 0.176 449 0.087 ‐0.037 0.108* ‐0.030 ‐0.276* 0.678* 1.000
0.07 0.43 0.02 0.52 0.00 0.00
Short‐term 
disparity 1.865 0.696 449 0.021 ‐0.029 ‐0.201* 0.016 0.127* ‐0.049 ‐0.278* 1.000
0.66 0.54 0.00 0.74 0.01 0.30 0.00
Long‐term 
disparity 0.908 0.811 449 ‐0.064 0.027 ‐0.118* 0.014 0.239* ‐0.894* ‐0.708* 0.259*
0.18 0.56 0.01 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Firm size 5.226 2.404 449 ‐0.218* 0.027 ‐0.388* 0.055 0.500* ‐0.471* ‐0.498* 0.340*
0.00 0.57 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R&D intensity
‐1.463 0.927 445 0.074 ‐0.023 0.076 ‐0.084 ‐0.650* 0.277* 0.295* ‐0.267*
0.12 0.63 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital 
structure  5.097 0.595 448 ‐0.025 0.024 ‐0.052 0.855* ‐0.037 ‐0.023 ‐0.059 0.010
0.60 0.61 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.63 0.21 0.83
Tobin's Q 1.441 0.607 447 0.032 0.065 0.005 ‐0.129* ‐0.123* ‐0.049 ‐0.140* ‐0.021
0.49 0.17 0.91 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.66
CEO Age 53.063 6.590 432 0.111* ‐0.228* ‐0.303* ‐0.053 0.023 0.075 ‐0.034 0.148*
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.64 0.12 0.48 0.00
TMT Size 4.735 0.815 449 ‐0.171* 0.047 ‐0.071 ‐0.066 0.172* ‐0.149* ‐0.091 0.120*
0.00 0.32 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
CEO equity ‐5.463 2.119 435 ‐0.008 0.074 0.378* ‐0.031 ‐0.140* 0.220* 0.222* ‐0.190*
0.87 0.12 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TMT equity ‐7.042 1.838 447 0.129* 0.000 0.259* 0.016 ‐0.113* 0.201* 0.240* ‐0.213*
0.01 1.00 0.00 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Repeated cites 4.673 2.645 449 ‐0.476* 0.666* ‐0.205* ‐0.021 0.253* ‐0.282* ‐0.318* 0.215*
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unique cites 3.142 1.873 449 0.099* 0.190* ‐0.379* ‐0.008 0.296* ‐0.320* ‐0.360* 0.293*
0.04 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prior patents 3.527 1.827 449 ‐0.441* 0.214* ‐0.352* ‐0.008 0.325* ‐0.358* ‐0.386* 0.224*
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Table 4.7 (cont’d) 
Variable
Long‐term 
disparity Firm size
R&D 
intensity
Capital 
structure 
Tobin's 
Q
CEO 
Age TMT Size
CEO 
equity
TMT 
equity
Repeat‐ 
ed cites
Unique 
cites
Exploratory 
search
Exploitative 
search
Available slack
Potential slack
Actual‐to‐
aspired 
performance
CEO short‐
term ratio
TMT short‐
term ratio
Short‐term 
disparity
Long‐term 
disparity 1.000
Firm size 0.489* 1.000
0.00
R&D intensity
‐0.292* ‐0.691* 1.000
0.00 0.00
Capital 
structure  0.034 0.044 ‐0.025 1.000
0.47 0.35 0.61
Tobin's Q 0.036 ‐0.213* 0.332* ‐0.037 1.000
0.45 0.00 0.00 0.43
CEO Age ‐0.066 0.136* ‐0.142* 0.018 0.014 1.000
0.17 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.77
TMT Size 0.166* 0.374* ‐0.183* ‐0.010 ‐0.122* ‐0.061 1.000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.01 0.20
CEO equity ‐0.225* ‐0.475* 0.245* ‐0.024 ‐0.018 ‐0.193* ‐0.037 1.000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.71 0.00 0.44
TMT equity ‐0.226* ‐0.447* 0.263* ‐0.011 0.089 ‐0.117* ‐0.054 0.326* 1.000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.06 0.02 0.25 0.00
Repeated cites 0.298* 0.609* ‐0.324* 0.052 ‐0.027 ‐0.033 0.265* ‐0.273* ‐0.237* 1.000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.57 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unique cites 0.345* 0.665* ‐0.409* 0.061 0.007 0.146* 0.208* ‐0.419* ‐0.248* 0.647* 1.000
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prior patents 0.364* 0.816* ‐0.419* 0.054 ‐0.082 0.073 0.356* ‐0.426* ‐0.356* 0.786* 0.700*
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
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Firm size also generated the highest VIF value, the only value coming close to 10.  
In light of these factors, I considered dropping firm size (assets) and just keeping 
prior patents.  Before doing that, I wanted to also check the stability of the 
variables.   
Variables may be unstable if signs (+/-) are different as between the 
correlation matrix and regression coefficients.  To determine this, I entered each of 
the variables in the .reg3 regression equation and compared the signs with those 
from the correlation matrix.  The results are shown in Table 4.9.  In each case, the 
constant and predictor variable returned the same coefficient sign as that indicated 
in the correlation matrix.  This consistency in signs suggests that the coefficients are 
stable and multicollinearity is not too problematic.  Thus, firm size was not dropped 
as a variable; I next ran the regressions.  
Regression Models 
I ran the data using two regression routines in STATA: .reg3 and .xtivreg.  
As previously discussed, .reg3 allows two or more dependent variables to entered in 
the same model, while .xtivreg runs them separately, while controlling for the other 
DV.  Both are appropriate given the current data (unbalanced panel data with 
continuous DVs). 
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Table 4.9 
Variable
Exploratory 
search
Sign in 
.reg3 
Exploitative 
search
Sign in 
.reg3
Exploratory search 1.000
Exploitative search ‐0.329* 1.000
0.00
Available slack 0.004 pos 0.1512* pos
0.94 0.00
Potential slack ‐0.026 neg ‐0.058 neg
0.59 0.22
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance ‐0.085 neg 0.045 pos
0.07 0.34
CEO short‐term ratio 0.083 pos ‐0.033 neg
0.08 0.48
TMT short‐term ratio 0.087 pos ‐0.037 neg
0.07 0.43
Short‐term disparity 0.021 pos ‐0.029 neg
0.66 0.54
Long‐term disparity ‐0.064 neg 0.027 pos
0.18 0.56
Firm size ‐0.218* neg 0.027 pos
0.00 0.57
R&D intensity 0.074 pos ‐0.023 neg
0.12 0.63
Capital structure  ‐0.025 neg 0.024 pos
0.60 0.61
Tobin's Q 0.032 pos 0.065 pos
0.49 0.17
CEO Age 0.111* pos ‐0.228* neg
0.02 0.00
TMT Size ‐0.171* neg 0.047 pos
0.00 0.32
CEO equity ‐0.008 neg 0.074 pos
0.87 0.12
TMT equity 0.129* pos 0.000 0 (neg)
0.01 1.00
Repeated cites ‐0.476* neg 0.666* pos
0.00 0.00
Unique cites 0.099* pos 0.190* pos
0.04 0.00
Prior patents ‐0.441* neg 0.214* pos
0.00 0.00  
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REG3 Model 
I first ran the data with .reg3, entering the control and dummy variables first, 
then slack, performance and TMT effects in separate models to show their 
individual effects, and then a full model of all variables was run.  For the dummy 
variables, the year 2000 was removed since that year had the most number of 
observations (http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/dummy_variables.htm, 
Last Accessed: June 5, 2009.).   Confidence Intervals (CIs) are included for the full 
model.  The results are presented in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, below. 
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Table 4.10 
reg3 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3
DV:
Exploratory Search Controls
Main 
Effects: Main Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects: Confidence  Intervals
Slack
Perfor‐ 
mance TMT Full for Full Model
Controls:
R&D intensity (log) ‐0.017* ‐0.005 ‐0.020 0.009
Capital structure 
(log) 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.016 0.013
Tobin's Q (log) 0.009 ‐0.007 ‐0.026 0.012
TMT Size 0.002 0.005 ‐0.007 0.017
Prior patents (log) ‐0.028* ‐0.035 ‐0.042 ‐0.028
1994 0.017 ‐0.014* ‐0.076 0.049
1995 0.006 0.003 ‐0.046 0.051
1996 ‐0.018 ‐0.008 ‐0.044 0.027
1997 ‐0.014 ‐0.011 ‐0.047 0.024
1998 0.005 0.004 ‐0.038 0.045
1999 ‐0.005 ‐0.003 ‐0.039 0.033
2001 ‐0.031 t ‐0.039* ‐0.073 ‐0.006
2002 ‐0.038* ‐0.046** ‐0.085 ‐0.009
2003 ‐0.071 ‐0.075** ‐0.113 ‐0.037
Independent Variables:
Available slack (log) ‐0.016* ‐0.001 ‐0.013 0.011
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) ‐0.041 ‐0.006 ‐0.101 0.088
CEO Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.004
Short‐term 
disparity 0.008 0.009 ‐0.007 0.024
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) 0.014 0.014 ‐0.014 0.043
CEO short‐term 
ratio 0.016 0.014 ‐0.070 0.098
TMT short‐term 
ratio ‐0.017 ‐0.023 ‐0.103 0.057
CEO equity (log) ‐.012** ‐0.011** ‐0.016 ‐0.006
TMT equity (log) 0.003 0.003 ‐0.003 0.008
Model Statistics:
R Square 0.249** .265** 0.255** .314** .3185**
R Square Change ‐ +.016 +.006 0.065 +.070
Chi‐Sq   146.580 159.66 150.44 188 190.640
Chi‐Sq Change ‐ 13.080 3.860 41.420 44.060  
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Table 4.11 
reg3 Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3
DV:
Exploitative Search Controls
Main 
Effects: Main Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects: Confidence  Intervals
Slack
Perfor‐ 
mance TMT Full for Full Model
Controls:
R&D intensity (log) 0.015 ‐0.008 ‐0.041 0.026
Capital structure 
(log) 0.007 0.009 ‐0.024 0.041
Tobin's Q (log) 0.015 0.041 t ‐0.002 0.084
TMT Size ‐0.005 ‐0.016 ‐0.043 0.012
Prior patents (log) 0.033* 0.056** 0.040 0.071
1994 ‐0.088 ‐0.017 ‐0.157 0.123
1995 ‐0.056 ‐0.036 ‐0.145 0.074
1996 0.013 ‐0.007 ‐0.088 0.073
1997 0.016 ‐0.003 ‐0.083 0.078
1998 0.012 0.032 ‐0.061 0.126
1999 ‐0.001 0.016 ‐0.065 0.098
2001 0.026 0.012 ‐0.064 0.087
2002 ‐0.022 ‐0.019 ‐0.105 0.067
2003 ‐0.078 t ‐0.091* ‐0.177 ‐0.007
Independent Variables:
Available slack (log) 0.066** 0.048** 0.022 0.075
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) 0.066 ‐0.072 ‐0.284 0.141
CEO Age ‐0.007** ‐0.006** ‐0.009 ‐0.002
Short‐term 
disparity ‐0.013 ‐0.006 ‐0.041 0.029
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) ‐0.011 0.015 ‐0.050 0.079
CEO short‐term 
ratio 0.065 0.070 ‐0.120 0.260
TMT short‐term 
ratio 0.053 0.070 ‐0.111 0.251
CEO equity (log) 0.017** 0.012* 0.001 0.024
TMT equity (log) 0.002 0.001 ‐0.011 0.013
Model Statistics:
R Square 0.077** 0.142** 0.255** .314** 0.183**
R Square Change ‐ +.065 +.178 +.237 +.106
Chi‐Sq   36.900 73.13 38.32 76.89 91.540
Chi‐Sq Change ‐ 36.230 1.420 39.990 54.640  
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XTIVREG Model 
 Next, I ran the models using .xtivreg.  With this procedure, each dependent 
variable is entered separately, but the other (secondary) endogenous variable is 
indicated within the equation.  Additionally, an indicator variable is entered for 
each of the secondary endogenous variables that is related to the secondary variable 
but not the primary one.  For example, for the exploratory search equation, 
exploitative search was the secondary equation.  Repeated cites was strongly 
positively correlated with exploitative search (since it reflects the number of cites 
the firm has repeatedly used over the prior 5 years) but was negatively correlated 
with exploratory search.  For exploratory search, unique cites was a key variable in 
calculating the exploratory search value.  While it did not appear to be as strongly 
correlated with exploratory search as repeated cites was with exploitative search, it 
was still theoretically the most appropriate instrumental variable and was used. 
Taken together, these analyses reveal somewhat consistent findings.  The 
results of the hypotheses tests are discussed next.  In some instances, the result was 
not statistically significant but was within the estimated CI.  In situations where the 
CI does not overlap 0, it can be inferred that 95% of the CIs drawn from the 
population would contain the true value.  This is not a probability statistic, per se, 
but does provide some support for the range of values that likely contain the 
population parameter (Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs, 2003).  However, when the CI 
overlaps zero, the interpretability of the CI decreases.  Because of the potential 
importance of the CI, I make note of it, as well.  Findings from this model are 
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presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13  A summary of the findings for the hypotheses is 
included in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.12 
xtivreg Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3
DV:
Exploratory Search Controls
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects: Confidence  Intervals
Slack
Perfor‐ 
mance TMT Full for Full Model
Controls:
R&D intensity (log) 0.005 0.010 ‐0.014 0.033
Capital structure 
(log) ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐0.019 0.006
Tobin's Q (log) 0.028* 0.012 ‐0.010 0.035
TMT Size ‐0.007 ‐0.009 ‐0.025 0.007
Prior patents (log) ‐0.109** ‐0.082** ‐0.104 ‐0.061
1994 0.014 0.017 ‐0.041 0.074
1995 ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.051 0.044
1996 ‐0.015 ‐0.008 ‐0.044 0.028
1997 ‐0.008 0.000 ‐0.035 0.035
1998 0.005 0.012 ‐0.026 0.051
1999 ‐0.010 0.010 ‐0.023 0.043
2001 ‐0.012 ‐0.019 ‐0.048 0.011
2002 0.006 ‐0.004 ‐0.042 0.033
2003 ‐0.036 ‐0.036 t ‐0.075 0.002
Independent Variables:
Available slack (log) .023* 0.022* 0.004 0.041
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) 0.006 ‐0.019 ‐0.120 0.081
CEO Age 0.000 0.000 ‐0.002 0.003
Short‐term disparity ‐0.006 ‐0.008 ‐0.031 0.014
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) 0.040 t 0.04 t ‐0.007 0.089
CEO short‐term ratio 0.058 0.063 ‐0.068 0.194
TMT short‐term 
ratio 0.056 0.050 ‐0.034 0.135
CEO equity (log) ‐0.003 ‐0.003 ‐0.012 0.005
TMT equity (log) 0.000 ‐0.001 ‐0.007 0.006
Model Statistics:
R Square 0.180 0.165 0.187 0.196 0.181
R Square Change ‐0.015 0.007 0.016 0.001
Chi‐Sq   475.500 484.99** 473.02** 539.13** 549.71**
Chi‐Sq Change 9.490 ‐2.480 63.630 74.210  
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Table 4.13 
xtivreg Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 3
DV:
Exploitative Search Controls
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects:
Main 
Effects: Confidence  Intervals
Slack
Perfor‐ 
mance TMT Full for Full Model
Controls: ‐0.008 ‐0.059 0.043
R&D intensity (log) ‐0.007 0.010 ‐0.018 0.038
Capital structure 
(log) 0.008 0.023 ‐0.025 0.071
Tobin's Q (log) 0.010 0.013 ‐0.020 0.047
TMT Size 0.007 0.06* 0.006 0.123
Prior patents (log) 0.065 ‐0.039 ‐0.163 0.085
1994 ‐0.023 0.012 ‐0.091 0.114
1995 0.029 0.033 ‐0.045 0.111
1996 0.053 0.007 ‐0.069 0.082
1997 0.050 0.014 ‐0.069 0.096
1998 0.025 ‐0.003 ‐0.075 0.069
1999 0.009 ‐0.009 ‐0.073 0.055
2001 0.004 ‐0.098** ‐0.175 ‐0.023
2002 ‐0.079 ‐0.120** ‐0.196 ‐0.045
2003 ‐0.113
Independent Variables:
Available slack (log) 0.015 0.010 ‐0.032 0.051
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) 0.066 0.041 ‐0.176 0.257
CEO Age 0.002 0.002 ‐0.003 0.007
Short‐term disparity ‐0.023 ‐0.091 ‐0.374 0.192
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) ‐0.059 ‐0.071 ‐0.253 0.110
CEO short‐term ratio ‐0.100 ‐0.025 ‐0.073 0.023
TMT short‐term 
ratio ‐0.077 ‐0.058 ‐0.163 0.048
CEO equity (log) 0.008 0.008 ‐0.011 0.026
TMT equity (log) ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.015 0.013
Model Statistics:
R Square 0.02 0.029 0.022 0.016 0.021
R Square Change 0.009 0.002 ‐0.004 0.001
Wald Chi‐Sq   1429.86** 1438.16** 1412.1** 1349.42** 1328.35**
Wald Chi‐Sq Change 8.300 ‐17.760 ‐80.440 ‐101.510  
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Table 4.14 
Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis (with brief summary) reg3 Model xtivreg Model
1a (greater performance shortfall, more exploration) NS NS
1b (greater performance shortfall, less exploitation) NS NS
2a (more slack, more exploration) NS 0.05
2b (less slack, more exploitation) NS NS
3a (higher age, less exploration) 0.01 (opp) NS
3b (higher age, more exploitation) 0.01 (opp) NS
4a (greater short‐term disparity, less exploration) NS NS
4b (greater short‐term disparity, more exploitation) NS NS
5a (greater long‐term disparity, less exploration) NS 0.10 (opp)
5b (greater long‐term disparity, more exploitation) NS NS
6a (higher CEO current ratio, less exploration) NS NS
6b (higher CEO current ratio, more exploitation) NS NS
7a (lower TMT current ratio, more exploration) NS NS
7b (higher TMT current ratio, more exploitation) NS NS
8a (more CEO equity, less exploration) 0.01 NS
8b (more CEO equity, more exploitation) 0.05 NS
9a (more TMT equity, less exploration) NS NS
9b (more TMT equity, more exploitation) NS NS  
Hypotheses Results 
Hypothesis 1a and 1b 
Hypothesis 1a argued that as the performance gap increases, that firms 
would be more inclined to engage in exploratory search.  No support was found for 
this hypothesis.  Likewise, hypothesis 1b, which argued that as the performance gap 
increases, that exploitative search would increase, was not found to be statistically 
significant.  The coefficient was within the CI (-0.175 to +0.257) but the interval 
overlapped zero. 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b 
The hypotheses that argued financial slack would be positively associated 
with exploitation and negatively associated with exploitation found some support.  I 
initially planned to examine all three financial slack variables (potential, available 
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and recoverable).  However, recoverable slack had too many missing values and 
recoverable slack did not transform as well as available slack, so I only examined 
the relationships between available slack and search.  Both models showed 
significant, positive, relationship between available slack and exploratory search (at 
the .05 level) in “Model 2a” which looked at the control variables and slack.   
However, in the .reg3 model, the relationship lost its significance for the full 
model.  Thus, hypothesis 2a is confirmed (in the .xtivreg model), which argued that 
as financial slack increased, top executives would have more flexibility in directing 
more exploratory search.  However, hypothesis 2b, which argued that as slack 
increased, exploitative search would decrease, found no support in the .reg3 model.  
The coefficient was within the CI on the .xtivreg model, but again, the interval 
spanned zero, undermining the interpretability of the result. 
Hypothesis 3a and 3b 
Just as with the problem-based search and slack-based search hypotheses, 
the findings related to the CEO and top managers were also mixed.  Hypotheses 3a 
and 3b argued that as CEOs aged, they would become less risk tolerant and, thus, 
prefer exploitative search to exploratory search.  Hypothesis 3a (as CEOs aged, they 
would direct less exploratory search) had strong support (at the .01 level) under the 
.reg3 model and in the .xtivreg model, the coefficient was within the CI.   
However, the results were in the opposite direction from that hypothesized.  
Specifically, the results indicated that as CEOs age, they direct more exploratory 
search.  Likewise, hypotheses 3b was supported at the .01 level (in the .reg3 model), 
lending support for the argument that as CEOs age, they direct less exploitative 
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search.  In the .xtivreg model, the coefficient was within the CI, but again, the CI 
included zero. 
Hypothesis 4a and 4b 
The next two sets of hypotheses looked at the relationship between pay 
disparity and search.  In the first set, I hypothesized that as the disparity of annual 
salary compensation between the CEO and the rest of the TMT decreased that 
exploratory search would increase (4a) but that as the disparity increased, that 
exploitative search would increase (4b).  No support was found for hypotheses 4a or 
4b (although the .reg3 model for hypothesis 4a included the coefficient within its 
zero-spanning CI; additionally, the coefficient was positive instead of negative as I 
hypothesized).   
Hypothesis 5a and 5b 
In the second set of hypotheses related to disparity and search, I made 
similar arguments – that as disparity of option compensation increased, that 
exploratory search would decrease (5a) and exploitative search would increase (5b).  
Hypothesis 5a was significant at the .10 level under the .xtivreg model (and within 
the zero-spanning CI of the .reg3 model), but in the opposite direction.  This result 
suggests that exploratory search may increase as the disparity of option 
compensation between the CEO and other TMT members increases.  Hypothesis 5b 
was not significant under either model but under the .reg3 model, the coefficient 
was within the zero-spanning CI. 
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Hypothesis 6a, 6b, 7a and 7b 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 explored the relationships between current (versus long-
term) compensation and search preferences, generally arguing that long-term 
compensation would be associated with exploration and short-term compensation 
would be related with exploitation.  I found no support for hypothesis 6a (lower 
CEO annual salary would encourage more exploratory search), although in both 
models, the coefficient was within the zero-spanning CI (although in a direction 
opposite to what I argued).  Likewise, for hypothesis 6b, no support was found but 
the coefficient was within the CIs (with the .reg3 model in the direction I 
hypothesized and the .xtivreg model in the opposite direction).  Hypotheses 7a and 
7b likewise produced no statistically significant results, with one model (.reg3) 
finding the coefficient within a zero-spanning CI. 
Hypothesis 8a, 8b, 9a and 9b 
Hypotheses 8 and 9 examined how stock ownership affected search.  I found 
strong results (significant at the .01 level) in the .reg3 model for hypothesis 8a, in 
which I argued that less stock ownership by the CEO would encourage greater risk 
taking and facilitate more exploratory search.  The .xtivreg did not produce 
statistically significant results, however.  For hypothesis 8b, I also found significant 
results (at the .05 level) in the .reg3 model and a coefficient within the zero-
spanning CI for the .xtivreg model.  I found no significant results for either 
hypotheses 9a or 9b, in which I argued that greater stock ownership by the TMT 
(minus the CEO) would encourage greater risk taking and encourage more 
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exploratory search.  I did find coefficients within zero-spanning CIs in both models 
in partial (though perhaps poor) support of both hypothesis 9a and 9b. 
Post-Hoc Analysis 
Given the very few statistically significant results, I wanted to further 
analyze the data to try and determine what the cause might be.  My chief suspicion 
was based on observations of the pharmaceutical industry in which there seem to be 
a few large firms and many small ones.  If there was somewhat of a clear distinction 
between the large and small firms, then examining them altogether may obscure the 
results that either large or small sets of firms might otherwise reveal.  Thus, I 
examined the panels to see if there was such a clean break between large and small 
firms.   
Total assets and total patent applications seemed like two likely variables 
that would show a clear distinction between the relative size and patenting power of 
the firms.  To look at the impact of the large firms over the entire data sets, I 
summed the total assets and total patent applications, per firm, over the entire ten 
panels, took the log of those numbers and then calculated the Z-score of each. 
The rank ordering of these scores showed a reasonable distinction between 
small and large firms, with a few firms somewhat in the middle.  The six largest 
firms (Merck, Pfizer, Bristol-Myers, Eli Lilly, Wyeth and Abbott (in descending 
order)) all had Z-scores above 1 for both assets and total patent applications.  
Conversely, the numerous small firms all had negative Z-scores for both of those 
variables.  Four firms were in the middle.  Isis and Allergan had positive total patent 
applications but negative asset values.  Warner-Lambert and Schering-Plough both 
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had positive total patent application and total asset scores between 0 and 1.  This 
rough estimate suggests that the six firms with assets and total patents above 1 may 
be the “big” firms in the pharmaceutical industry, Schering-Plough, Isis, Allergan 
and Warner-Lambert are (or were) medium-sized players and all the other firms are 
small firms. 
For purposes of initial post-hoc investigation, I looked at the large firms and 
the small firms to see what differences would arise, if any (ignoring the “middle” 
firms for now).  The full model using the .reg3 command for the six large firms is 
immediately below in Table 4.15 (the .xtivreg model was also examined and the 
results were similar, except that the .xtivreg model had slightly fewer significant 
relationships).  The full model, also using the .reg3 command for the smaller firms 
is presented below that in Table 4.16.  Below, Table 4.17, summarizes the 
relationships for both the “large” and “small” firms.  The findings from this post-
hoc analysis are discussed in the Chapter Five, along with the discussion of the 
results from the full sample. 
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Table 4.15 
reg3 "Large" firms reg3 "Large" firms
DV: Exploratory Search DV: Exploitative Search
Main Effects: Conf Interval Main Effects: Conf Interval
Full for Full Model Full for Full Model
Controls: Controls:
R&D intensity (log) 0.017 0.001 0.034 R&D intensity (log) 0.067 ‐0.029 0.162
Capital structure (log) 0.061 t ‐0.007 0.130 Capital structure (log) 0.258 ‐0.141 0.657
Tobin's Q (log) 0.000 ‐0.022 0.022 Tobin's Q (log) ‐0.058 ‐0.186 0.071
TMT Size ‐0.006 ‐0.017 0.006 TMT Size 0.067* 0.001 0.133
Prior patents (log) ‐0.011 t ‐0.024 0.002 Prior patents (log) ‐0.024 ‐0.099 0.051
1994 0.070* 0.010 0.126 1994 ‐0.332* ‐0.670 0.005
1995 0.044** 0.013 0.076 1995 ‐0.167 t ‐0.347 0.013
1996 0.030 t ‐0.001 0.062 1996 ‐0.146 ‐0.331 0.038
1997 0.040** 0.009 0.071 1997 ‐0.117 ‐0.297 0.062
1998 0.036** 0.010 0.062 1998 ‐0.073 ‐0.226 0.080
1999 0.010 ‐0.006 0.027 1999 ‐0.003 ‐0.099 0.093
2001 0.028* ‐0.001 0.058 2001 ‐0.082 ‐0.252 0.088
2002 0.016 ‐0.022 0.054 2002 ‐0.199 t ‐0.419 0.020
2003 ‐0.012 ‐0.042 0.018 2003 ‐0.297** ‐0.470 ‐0.123
Independent Variables: Independent Variables:
Available slack (log) 0.005 ‐0.012 0.023 Available slack (log) 0.158** 0.056 0.261
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (constant 
+ sq rt) 0.131** 0.035 0.227
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance (constant 
+ sq rt) ‐0.321 ‐0.878 0.237
CEO Age 0.002** 0.001 0.003 CEO Age 0.002 ‐0.003 0.008
Short‐term disparity ‐0.010 ‐0.025 0.005 Short‐term disparity 0.107** 0.020 0.195
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) 0.055* 0.008 0.103
Long‐term disparity 
(constant + log) ‐0.364** ‐0.640 ‐0.088
CEO short‐term ratio 0.145 t ‐0.010 0.301 CEO short‐term ratio ‐1.208** ‐2.109 ‐0.307
TMT short‐term ratio 0.041 ‐0.011 0.094 TMT short‐term ratio 0.382** 0.078 0.685
CEO equity (log) ‐0.018** ‐0.025 ‐0.012 CEO equity (log) ‐0.012 ‐0.051 0.027
TMT equity (log) 0.005 0.002 0.009 TMT equity (log) 0.006 ‐0.016 0.028
Model Statistics: Model Statistics:
R Square .747** R Square .603**
Chi‐Sq   162.500 Wald Chi‐Sq   83.480  
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Table 4.16 
reg3 "Small" Firms reg3 "Small" Firms
DV: Exploratory Search DV: Exploitative Search
Main Effects: Conf Interval Main Effects: Conf Interval
Full for Full Model Full for Full Model
Controls: Controls:
R&D intensity (log) ‐0.003 ‐0.021 0.014 R&D intensity (log) ‐0.013 ‐0.051 0.025
Capital structure 
(log) ‐0.004 ‐0.024 0.017
Capital structure 
(log) 0.001 ‐0.044 0.045
Tobin's Q (log) ‐0.006 ‐0.028 0.016 Tobin's Q (log) 0.046* ‐0.002 0.094
TMT Size 0.009 ‐0.005 0.023 TMT Size ‐0.014 ‐0.045 0.016
Prior patents (log) ‐0.050** ‐0.060 ‐0.041 Prior patents (log) 0.062** 0.040 0.083
1994 ‐0.045 ‐0.165 0.074 1994 0.000 ‐0.262 0.263
1995 ‐0.015 ‐0.080 0.050 1995 0.004 ‐0.139 0.147
1996 ‐0.017 ‐0.059 0.025 1996 0.005 ‐0.088 0.097
1997 ‐0.016 ‐0.058 0.025 1997 0.013 ‐0.078 0.104
1998 0.003 ‐0.047 0.053 1998 0.033 ‐0.077 0.142
1999 ‐0.001 ‐0.043 0.041 1999 0.012 ‐0.080 0.105
2001 ‐0.045* ‐0.084 ‐0.006 2001 0.021 ‐0.065 0.107
2002 ‐0.049* ‐0.094 ‐0.004 2002 0.008 ‐0.090 0.107
2003 ‐0.074** ‐0.119 ‐0.030 2003 ‐0.055 ‐0.154 0.043
Independent Variables: Independent Variables:
Available slack 
(log) 0.015* 0.000 0.030
Available slack 
(log) 0.030 t ‐0.003 0.064
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) ‐0.012 ‐0.040 0.017
Actual‐to‐aspired 
performance 
(constant + sq rt) ‐0.013 ‐0.075 0.049
CEO Age 0.001 t 0.000 0.003 CEO Age 0.006** ‐0.010 ‐0.002
Short‐term 
disparity 0.006 ‐0.012 0.024
Short‐term 
disparity 0.003 ‐0.038 0.043
Long‐term 
disparity (constant 
+ log) 0.008 ‐0.023 0.040
Long‐term 
disparity (constant 
+ log) 0.019 ‐0.050 0.088
CEO short‐term 
ratio 0.005 ‐0.087 0.097
CEO short‐term 
ratio 0.061 ‐0.142 0.263
TMT short‐term 
ratio ‐0.030 ‐0.125 0.065
TMT short‐term 
ratio 0.044 ‐0.164 0.253
CEO equity (log) ‐0.009 ‐0.015 ‐0.003 CEO equity (log) 0.005 ‐0.008 0.017
TMT equity (log) 0.005 t ‐0.001 0.011 TMT equity (log) 0.002 ‐0.011 0.016
Model Statistics: Model Statistics:
R Square .350** R Square .175**
Chi‐Sq   175.680 Wald Chi‐Sq   69.370  
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Table 4.17 
Summary of Post‐Hoc Analysis Results for...  "Large" Firms "Small" Firms
Hypothesis (with brief summary) Reg3 Model Reg3 Model
1a (greater performance shortfall, more exploration) 0.01 NS
1b (greater performance shortfall, less exploitation) NS NS
2a (more slack, more exploration) NS .05 (opp)
2b (less slack, more exploitation) 0.01 0.01
3a (higher age, less exploration) .01 (opp) 0.10 (opp)
3b (higher age, more exploitation) NS 0.01 (opp)
4a (greater short‐term disparity, less exploration) NS NS
4b (greater short‐term disparity, more exploitation) 0.01 NS
5a (greater long‐term disparity, less exploration) 0.05 (opp) NS
5b (greater long‐term disparity, more exploitation) 0.01 (opp) NS
6a (higher CEO current ratio, less exploration) 0.10 (opp) NS
6b (higher CEO current ratio, more exploitation) 0.01 (opp) NS
7a (lower TMT current ratio, more exploration) NS NS
7b (higher TMT current ratio, more exploitation) 0.01 (opp) NS
8a (more CEO equity, less exploration) 0.01 NS
8b (more CEO equity, more exploitation) NS NS
9a (more TMT equity, less exploration) NS 0.10
9b (more TMT equity, more exploitation) NS NS
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I sought to examine the drivers of exploratory and  
exploitative search.  Beginning with the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963), I investigated how exploration and exploitation were driven by 
financial slack and problemistic search.  Also, realizing that it is the individuals 
within firms that ultimately determine the search behaviors in which firms engage, I 
explored how demographic characteristics and compensation of top management 
team members influenced search behaviors.   
 The driving force behind this dissertation was the recognition that “search” 
is not the uni-dimensional construct it has typically been associated with, but is 
rather a bi-dimensional construct that requires a more fine-grained analysis.  More 
specifically, prior research has frequently looked at how slack, problems and 
executive demographics and compensation have affected search in a broad sense 
(usually by looking at R&D or patenting intensity) (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989).  However, given that search can be categorized along lines such as broad or 
narrow, deep or shallow or near or far (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 
2002), it was important to examine how these drivers affect each type of search 
differently.  Some recent research has begun to make in-roads into this research, but 
much work remains to be done.  
 Thus, in this dissertation, I tested a number of hypotheses focused on 
predicting exploratory and exploitative search.  My hypotheses and results, 
summarized in Table 4.14, were not well supported.  In the .reg3 model, only 3 of 
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my hypotheses were statistically significant in the direction I hypothesized (and one 
more was significant in the opposite direction).  The .xtivreg model yielded even 
less supportive results.  Given that the results were so poor, I conducted post-hoc 
analyses in which I split the largest firms out of the sample and re-ran two sets of 
analysis, one with the larger firms and the other with the smaller firms.  For greater 
parsimony, the discussion of the results will incorporate a discussion of the full 
sample, as well as the larger and smaller firm samples.   
Problem-Based Search 
The first driver of search I examined was that of “problems.”  In this study, I 
operationalized “problems” as the degree to which firms failed to attain financial 
performance aspirations.  The rationale of these hypotheses was that when firms are 
achieving close to their target financials goals, they will engage in exploitative 
search behaviors (since they seem to be doing satisfactorily).  However, as 
performance worsens, there is a perceived need to search beyond usual sources of 
information and engage in exploratory search. 
Despite these reasonable arguments, I did not find significant results for the 
hypotheses that problems firms faced affected the type of search in which they 
engaged.  Since most of the smaller firms had negative performance and most of the 
larger firms had tremendously positively performance, this result is perhaps, in 
retrospect, not surprising.  However, even after splitting out the large/small 
samples, the results were similarly non-significant.  Only in the large firms did 
increasingly poor performance lead to greater exploratory search.  One possible 
explanation for these findings is that the calculation for the Aspiration Level for the 
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large and small firms is still calculated based on all of the firms.  A next step to take 
would be to recalculate Aspiration Level only for the firms of the same size and 
reanalyze the data. 
Slack-Based Search 
I also looked at how slack affected the type of search in which firms 
engaged.  The arguments here were that at low levels of slack, firms would prefer to 
engage in the types of search they had previously engaged in to make the best use 
of their slack resources.  As slack increased, they would be able to take more risks 
and engage in more exploratory search.  As with the problem-based search, I found 
no significant results for slack-based search in the full model. 
In the large/small analyses, however, some significant findings were found.  
In both large and small firms, exploitative search increases with greater financial 
slack resources, as hypothesized.  Additionally, exploratory search was shown to be 
positively affected by financial slack resources.  While these results could be 
encouraging when looked at individually, their meaning is somewhat watered down 
when looked at as a whole.  The results could lend some support to my hypotheses, 
but could just as well reflect the notion that firms with greater financial slack 
resources engage in more overall search than firms with less financial slack 
resources.  Thus, the ultimate implication of these findings is, as yet, undetermined. 
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TMT Demography, Compensation and Ownership 
These first two groups of hypotheses attempted to explore firm-level 
characteristics of search drivers and almost no significant results were found.  I next 
built upon the notion that it is not firms per se that engage in search behaviors, but 
rather executives in firms that lead and direct firms into which type of search 
behaviors they will engage.  Recognizing this, I next looked at certain demographic 
characteristics and compensation characteristics of top executives within firms to 
see how those factors impacted search.  Generally, similarly poor results were 
found, with but a few exceptions. 
Demography 
The only demographic characteristic I examined was CEO Age.  I had 
originally planned to also include the ages of top managers but was unable to do so 
due to data limitations.  Significant results were found for CEO age and search in 
the .reg3 model, though opposite to those hypothesized.  Prior research suggests 
that as individuals (including CEOs) age, they become more conservative and less 
risk seeking (e.g., Child, 1974; Chown, 1960; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Based 
on these results, I hypothesized that older CEOs would favor greater exploitation 
and less exploration – but found just the opposite.  That is, I actually found that 
older executives tended to be engaged in more exploitation and younger executives 
in more exploration.  While contrary to my stated hypotheses, this result has been 
found in other research as well (e.g., March and Sharpira, 1987).  These findings 
were largely supported in the “large” and “small” samples, as well – the only 
hypotheses generally supported across all three samples.   
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These findings are consistent with other literature that makes a different 
argument than the one I adopted.  This other research has argued that younger 
executives, instead of being more risk seeking, are actually greatly averse to taking 
risks because of inexperience and insecurity.  Younger executives may be 
concerned that they do not have the ability to effectively manage broad reaching, 
bold new initiatives.  Thus, they may seek to stick with what has been working to 
develop a strong track record and build a strong financial position for themselves, 
personally.  In this case, then, younger executives favor exploitative search and only 
as they age, would they favor more exploratory search behaviors.  My findings 
support this line of thought and may help add another lens to how age and search 
behaviors are related. 
Compensation  
Compensation Disparity 
In addition to demographic characteristics, I also examined how 
compensation and equity ownership influence search behaviors.  In the full sample 
and in the sample with smaller firms, no significant findings were found but in the 
sample with the large firms, 6 of the 8 hypotheses were significant.  These results 
generally indicate that in large (but not in small) pharmaceutical companies that 
executive compensation influences the type of search behaviors in which executives 
engage.  Why is this result seen in large firms but not small?  Further study is 
required, to be sure, but one reason may be that large firms have sufficient 
resources to compensate executives to such a degree that the amount and type of 
compensation actually matters. 
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However, in the smaller firms, none of the compensation variables were 
significant.  Thus, in small pharmaceutical firms, executive compensation did not 
appear to be driving search behaviors.  That could be because the firm-level factors 
such as financial slack are too dominant of factors for small firms.  Or, since 
compensation is typically lower at smaller firms, compensation may not be large 
enough to be sufficiently motivating to the executives.  Whatever the reasons, in 
large firms, compensation does seem to make a difference (at least in the small 
sample I examined). 
In the first set of hypotheses (4 and 5), I argued that compensation disparity 
between the CEO and the other TMT members would reduce collaboration and 
teamwork, which would put a damper on the search for new ideas, decreasing 
exploratory search.  However, this compensation disparity would encourage 
executives to look out for their own interests, which would ultimately lead to 
exploitative search patterns.  This line of reasoning was in keeping with prior 
research (Siegel and Hambrick, 2005); however, I found only partial support for it.  
For short-term pay disparity, greater disparity did lead to more exploitation but less 
disparity did not lead to more exploration. 
Interestingly, for long-term pay disparity, I found significant results but in 
the opposite direction from that hypothesized.  That is to say, greater long-term pay 
disparity was not associated with greater exploitation as prior theory would argue, 
but was, instead, associated with greater exploration.  The converse was also true, 
that lower levels of disparity were associated with greater exploitation.  These 
results may be telling us that as long-term pay disparity increases, executives are 
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individually motivated to increase exploratory search to increase their odds of 
making a major breakthrough.  But, perhaps, at lower levels of pay disparity, 
executives are equally motivated to work together to make sure they capitalize on 
their options, which leads to more exploitative search behaviors.  These findings 
seem to contradict much of the current findings and, therefore, require further 
investigation. 
Compensation Structure 
Two sets of hypotheses examined the impact that compensation structure 
had on search behaviors.  Specifically, I examined how the ratio of current salary to 
option compensation for CEOs and the other TMT members affected search.  The 
basic logic was that current compensation (annual salary and bonus) would 
encourage a short-term focus by the executives and lead to exploitative search 
behaviors, whereas option-compensation would encourage a long-term focus and 
lead to exploratory search.  Three of the four hypotheses were supported, but 
similar to the findings regarding compensation disparity, these results were all in 
the opposite direction from that hypothesized. 
For both CEOs and TMT members, a higher ratio of option compensation to 
salary compensation led to greater exploitative search.  For CEO (but not TMT) 
compensation, a higher ratio of current compensation led to more exploration.  
These results, though completely opposite to what I argued, are not beyond the 
scope of reason.  Given the long lead time for products in this industry (10-16 years 
from patent application to prescription-drugs) (Gassmann et al., 2004), executives 
are forced to have a long-term focus regardless of their compensation structure.   
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Borrowing my arguments regarding compensation disparity, it could be that 
executives with large option components want to make sure they keep their options.  
Since the industry is risky by nature, having a higher level of option compensation 
might actually encourage risk aversion in the executives.  Bringing these ideas 
together, greater option compensation in a risky industry may encourage 
exploitative search among the executives.  Continuing with this somewhat 
backwards rationale, a higher ratio of current compensation may lead executives to 
want to try and take more risks, to potentially earn greater options.  Despite these 
plausible explanations, this reasoning seems somewhat tenuous and further research 
is required. 
Equity Ownership 
Previous arguments regarding equity ownership and top executives focused 
on the implications flowing from the alignment of interests between managers with 
those of owners (Berle Jr. and Means, 1932).  It was argued that owners are 
typically more interested in the long-term success of the firm than in short-term 
gains, since they can diversify their risk portfolios by owning shares of numerous 
firms (Fama, 1980).  Under this line of argument, then, increasing the equity 
ownership of executives would align their interests with those of owners and 
encourage more risk-seeking behaviors. 
However, a new line of reasoning has re-examined these previous notions.  
Executives in firms already have a great deal of risk stemming from their 
employment risk, which cannot be diversified away.  When this risk is coupled with 
the down-side risk of equity ownership, recent research has argued that increasing 
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equity ownership actually works to reduce risk-seeking behaviors in executives and 
create more conservative tendencies.  Thus, I argued that less equity ownership 
would be predictive of more exploration and more equity ownership would be 
predictive of more exploitation.   
These results were present in the full sample for CEO equity ownership – 
but not for TMT equity ownership.  In the sample of large firms, less CEO equity 
ownership did lead to more exploratory search (but more CEO equity ownership did 
not lead to more exploitative search).  In the sample of small firms, CEO equity 
ownership was not associated with either type of search behavior, but less TMT 
equity ownership was associated with greater exploratory search.  I was pleased to 
find that the results that were found related to these hypotheses were in the direction 
hypothesized.  Somewhat comically though, these hypotheses were developed using 
the “alternate” logic which positioned them in contrast with typical arguments in 
prior work. 
Non-Significant Findings 
Overall, my dissertation has many more non-significant findings than 
significant ones.  Given the large window of time examined and number of panels 
explored, these non-findings were somewhat surprising.  There are several possible 
explanations for these non-findings which I will discuss next. 
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Explanations of Non Significant Findings 
The Findings May Not Exist 
First, the fact that most of the hypotheses were not supported may mean that 
the relationships I proposed simply do not exist.  What drives firms to do the things 
that they do is not as simple as researchers might hope it is.  I proposed numerous 
main effects and, given the various complexities involved in search behaviors, the 
phenomenon may not be that simply explained.  There may be complex moderated 
or mediated relationships.  There may be other drivers of search that I did not 
examine.  Or, there could be other reasons still that account for these non-findings. 
Theoretical Issues 
Alternately, the relationships may exist after all, but the study may be 
flawed.  There are competing theories on what drives search, and I may have sided 
with theories that are not as strong as the alternate theories.  The discussion 
regarding executive age is a good example of how competing theories may account 
for some of the results. 
Operationalization Issues 
Or, if the theories are articulated correctly, it could be that the measures 
have been operationalized incorrectly.  I measured exploration and exploitation 
based on patent citation counts, following Katila and Ahuja (2002).  However, other 
work has explored different ways of measuring exploration and exploitation, such 
as the technological class in which patents are filed (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001).  
Thus, it could be that using alternate, or simply additional, measures would have 
enabled a more appropriate test of my hypotheses.   
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Separately, there could be a problem with the explore/exploit measure of 
Katila and Ahuja (2002).  As currently calculated, there tends to be a bias against 
exploratory search, artificially lowering that value.  For example, if a small firm 
used 10 new citations in a given year, its exploratory search score would be high if 
it filed very few patents.  In contrast, a large firm that used 10 new citations but had 
filed thousands of patents would have a very low exploratory search score.  Yet, is 
it accurate to infer that the large firm is that much less exploratory in its search 
behavior simply because it had much more “non-new” search as compared with the 
small firm?  Perhaps, or perhaps not.  Either way, this issue requires further 
examination.   
Sample Issues 
Another explanation for the non-findings may be that, given the disparity of 
the size of the firms, that the findings are cluttered.  It was for this potential reason 
that I ran the post-hoc analysis in which I split the six largest firms from the 
smallest firms in the sample and re-ran the analysis.  Additional post-hoc analysis 
may be appropriate to help further understand these findings. 
Limitations 
Generalizability 
Every empirical study has limitations and this one is no exception.  Since 
the study was conducted in a single industry, there are questions of generalizability.  
I have argued that a single industry examination was appropriate given the 
questions I was trying to answer, yet any significant findings that are ultimately 
found must be interpreted with some caution. 
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Alternate Explanations 
Another limitation is that, even had significant results been found, I have not 
accounted for every possible alternate explanation.  For example, boards of 
directors have an influence on setting executive compensation and have at least 
some influence on the strategic direction of firms.  By not controlling for board 
effects, I have not ruled out the role that they may play.  This may be worth 
examining in the future. 
Alternate Conceptualizations 
Along the lines of the previous limitation are that there are various ways to 
operationalize different constructs, but I have just chosen one way for each item.  
For example, I operationalized “problems” as being financial problems experienced 
when firms fall short of their financial aspirations.  However, as I previously 
discussed, firms can certainly experience many other types of problems, particularly 
in the pharmaceutical industry.  Lawsuits, failed clinical trials, competitor products 
– all of these issues that firms deal with are “problems” that firms face and could 
very well be more directly impactful on the search behaviors in which firms engage 
(i.e., than is failing to meet financial projections).  Since I have only chosen one 
way to conceptualize this construct, I have not closed the door to the possibility that 
other operationalizations are more meaningful.   
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Future Directions 
Further Post-Hoc Analysis 
Given that no conclusive significant results were found, there are many 
future directions for this study.  The immediate focus will be to continue to tease 
apart the sample into appropriate sub-samples (such as the large/small split) to give 
the data a chance to speak.  There may be other effects such as the age of firms, or 
years since they went public, that may be playing into the results.  Additionally, 
there are other measures of search that could be employed, some of those revolving 
around the technological class in which the patents are filed (e.g., Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001).  All of these avenues have potential for further digging into this 
data along the current trajectory. 
Alternate Theory Consideration 
Additionally, the large number of significant findings in the opposite 
direction from what I hypothesized deserves serious consideration.  These results, 
taken as a whole, really tell quite a different picture about risk tolerance and risk 
preferences of executives than what has currently been articulated.  It is possible 
that any number of mistakes on my part has generated erroneous results.  However, 
if the study has been executed properly (as I believe it has been), then additional 
theoretical and empirical work is called for to further explore these results. 
Acquisition Likelihood 
Another extension seeks to capitalize on the large number of small firms 
present in the sample.  One positive outcome for small, new firms, particularly in 
the bio-tech/ pharmaceutical industry is to be acquired by large, established 
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pharmaceutical firms.  Typically, such acquisitions are made at a premium and the 
founders and top managers tend to reap great financial benefits from the buy-out.  
One interesting angle in this vein of research might be to examine how the degree to 
which firms engage in exploration and exploitation lead to acquisition likelihood 
and the premium paid for such acquisition.   
Searching and Finding 
Another direct extension of this dissertation could be investigating the 
relationship between exploratory and exploitative searching with ultimate 
exploratory and exploitative “finding.”  Prior work involving exploration and 
exploitation has focused on categorizing end products as being either exploratory or 
exploitative in nature (e.g., He and Wong, 2004).  This dissertation focused on 
drivers of exploratory and exploitative search behaviors.   
A next step in this stream could be to look at the relationship between the 
search behaviors firms take and how those search behaviors translate into finished 
products.  It is likely that exploratory search leads to products that are viewed as 
exploratory.  However, it is also possible that as firms dig more deeply into areas of 
expertise, they are able to gain greater depth of understanding into the technologies 
they possess and truly make major breakthroughs in those areas of expertise. 
Outcomes of Exploration and Exploitation 
More distally related to this study could be work related to possible 
outcomes of focusing on exploration or exploitation.  One pre-conception is that 
large pharmaceutical companies tend to not develop new, breakthrough drugs 
themselves, but rather acquire the companies that do.  Thus, it may be that the small 
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pharmaceutical firms that engage in exploration tend to be purchased, or purchased 
at a higher premium.  On the other hand, given that small firms have limited 
resources, it may be that they have to focus on one core technology and exploit it to 
the best of their abilities to garner the interest of suitors.  Or, following the 
ambidexterity hypothesis – that finding a balance between exploration and 
exploitation yields the greatest performance (He and Wong, 2004) – perhaps those 
small firms that are able to do both become the best acquisition targets.  Whatever 
the case, such an examination seems interesting and warranted. 
Exploration and Exploitation in Academia 
Another interesting study, while moving away from the pharmaceutical 
industry, but building on the idea of examining citations to determine a level of 
exploration and exploitation, would explore the degree to which research professors 
explore new knowledge or exploit currently possessed knowledge.  Recent work 
identified the most prolific authors in management (Podsakoff et al., 2008).  It 
might prove interesting to examine whether they have achieved such distinction 
through exploration, exploitation or both.  Empirical tools of bibliometric analysis 
would be available to make such a determination (Ramos-Rodriguez and Ruiz-
Navarro, 2004).   
Conclusion 
Over the past few decades, scores of articles have examined the risk 
preferences of firms and executives by employing coarse measures such as R&D 
expenditures or patenting propensity.  To some degree, these measures capture the 
extent to which firms are searching for new knowledge.  However, research 
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utilizing measures such as these have left researchers with only a partial picture of 
what kind of knowledge these firms are seeking.  Are their R&D dollars all being 
funneled into further refining products they have been selling for a generation?  Or 
are they focusing their R&D budget on exploring new areas that could propel them 
into the next generation?  Or some balance of both?   
This research has sought to help address these questions by taking a more 
fine-grained approach as to why firms engage in search.  I have endeavored to do 
this by analyzing the record contained in patent applications that documents the 
knowledge firms have relied upon in filing their patents.  Utilizing measures 
developed by professors Katila and Ahuja (2002), I explored how problems, 
financial slack and TMT demographic characteristics and compensation systems 
influence the degree to which firms engage in exploratory and exploitative search. 
While the results I have obtained have not shed much light on this subject 
yet, the groundwork has been laid to hopefully make contributions to theory, 
research and practice that are both interesting and practical.  By seeking to 
supplement coarse-grained “R&D” and “patenting propensity” research with finer-
grained measures such as I have done, I hope that future research can continue to 
make strides in painting a clearer picture of what drives search behaviors within 
firms.   
104 
 
REFERENCES 
2002. Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations. LexisNexis Group: New Providence, N. J. 
Adhmadjian CL, Robinson P. 2001. Safety in numbers: Downsizing and the 
deinstitutionalizaiton of permanent employment in Japan. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 46: 622-654. 
Agrawal A, Henderson R. 2002. Putting patents in context: Exploring knowledge 
transfer from MIT. Management Science 48(1): 44-60. 
Ahuja G, Lampert CM. 2001. Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: A 
longitudinal study of how established firms create breakthrough inventions. 
Strategic Management Journal 22: 521-543. 
Amason AC, Shrader RC, Tompson GH. 2006. Newness and novelty: Relating top 
management team composition to new venture performance. Journal of Business 
Venturing 21: 125-148. 
Antle R, Fellingham J. 1990. Resource rationing and organizational slack in a two-
period model. Journal of Applied Research 28: 1-24. 
Argote L. 1999. Organizational learning: Creating, retaining and transferring 
knowledge. Kluwer Academic: Boston. 
Balkin DB, Markman GD, Gomez-Mejia LR. 2000. Is CEO pay in high-technology 
firms related to innovation? Academy of Management Journal 43(6): 1118-1129. 
Bantel KA, Jackson SE. 1989. Top management and innovations in banking: Does 
the composition of the top team make a difference? Strategic Management Journal 
10: 107-124. 
Barkema HG, Shvyrkov O. 2007. Does top management team diversity promote or 
hamper foreign expansion? Strategic Management Journal 28(7): 663-680. 
Barker III VL, Mueller GC. 2004. CEO characteristics and firm R&D spending. 
Management Science 48(6): 782-801. 
Barnard CI. 1938. The sociology of organizations. The Free Press. 
Barney JB. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management 17(1): 99-120. 
Barney JB. 2007. Gaining and Sustaining Competitive Advantage (Third ed.). 
Pearson Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. 
105 
 
Beatty RP, Zajac EJ. 1994a. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A 
study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public 
offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 313-335.   
Beatty RP, Zajac EJ. 1994b. Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A 
study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public 
offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 313-335. 
Beckman CM. 2006. The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm 
behavior. Academy of Management Journal 49(4): 741-758. 
Bergh DD. 1993. Don't "Waste" your time! The effects of time series errors in 
management research: The case of ownership concentration and research and 
development spending. Journal of Management 19(4): 897-914. 
Berle Jr. AA, Means GC. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. 
MacMillan: New York. 
Bierly P, Chakrabarti A. 1996. Generic knowledge strategies in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal 17(Winter Special Issue): 
23-135. 
Boeker W. 1997. Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics and 
organizational growth. Academy of Management Journal 40(1): 152-170. 
Bolton MK. 1993. Organizational innovation and substandard performance: When 
is necessity the mother of innovation. Organization Science 4: 57-75. 
Boone C, Van Olffen W, Van Witteloostuijn A, De Brabander B. 2004. The genesis 
of top management team diversity: Selective turnover among top management 
teams in Dutch newspaper publishing, 1970-94. Academy of Management Journal 
47(5): 633-656. 
Bourgeios LJ. 1981. On the measurement of organizational slack. Academy of 
Management Review 6: 29-39. 
Bourgeios LJ, Singh JV. 1983. Organizational slack and political behavior within 
top management teams. Academy of Management Proceedings: 43-47. 
Bromiley P. 1991. Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal 34(1): 37-59. 
Bulow JI, Geanakoplos JD, Klemperer PD. 1985. Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic 
substitutes and complements. The Journal of Political Economy 93(3): 488-511. 
Bunderson JS. 2003. Team member functional background and involvement in 
management teams: Direct effects and the moderating role of power centralization. 
Academy of Management Journal 46(4): 458-474. 
106 
 
Carlsson G, Karlsson K. 1970. Age, cohorts and the generation of generations. 
American Sociological Review 35: 710-718. 
Carpenter JN. 2000. Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? 
Journal of Finance 55(5): 2311-2331. 
Carpenter MA. 2002. The implications of strategy and social context for the 
relationship between top management team heterogeneity and firm performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 23(3): 275-284. 
Carpenter MA, Geletkanycz MA, Sanders WG. 2004. Upper echelons research 
revisted: Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team 
composition. Journal of Management 30(6): 749-778. 
Certo ST, Semadeni M. 2006. Strategy research and panel data: Evidence and 
implications. Journal of Management 32: 449-471. 
Chandy RK, Tellis GJ. 2000. The incumbent's curse? Incumbency, size, and radical 
product innovation. Journal of Marketing 64: 1-17. 
Chang SJ. 1996. An evolutionary perspective on diversification and corporate 
restructuring: Entry, exit, and economic performance during 1981-89. Strategic 
Management Journal 17(8): 587-611. 
Child J. 1974. Managerial and organiztaional factors associated with company 
performance. Journal of Management Studies 11: 13-27. 
Chown SM. 1960. The Wesley rigidity inventory: A factor-analytic approach. 
Journal of Abormal and Social Psychology 61: 491-494. 
Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG, Aiken LS. 2003. Applied Multiple 
Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (Third ed.). Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers: Mahwah, New Jersey; London. 
Cohen WM, Klepper S. 1996. A reprise of size and R&D. Economic Journal 106: 
925-951. 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA. 1989. Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D. 
Economic Journal 99: 569-596. 
Cohen WM, Levinthal DA. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1): 128-152. 
Coles JL, Daniel ND, Naveen L. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk-taking. 
Journal of Financial Economics 79: 431-468. 
Cyert RM, March JG. 1963. A behavioral theory of the firm. Prentice Hall. 
107 
 
Daily CM, Dalton DR. 1993. Boards of directors leadership and structure: Control 
and performance implications. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 17(3): 65-81. 
Daily CM, Johnson JL. 1997. Sources of CEO power and firm financial 
performance: A longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management 23: 117-297. 
Daily CM, Schwenk C. 1996. Chief executive officers, top management teams, and 
boards of directors: Congruent or countervailing forces? Journal of Management 
22(2): 185-208. 
Danneels E. 2002. The dynamics of product innovation and firm competences. 
Strategic Management Journal 23(12): 1095-1121. 
Davidson W, Xie B, Ning Y. 2007. The influence of executive age, career horizon 
and incentives on pre-turnover earnings management. Journal of Management and 
Governance 11: 45-60. 
Dechow P, Sloan R. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 14: 51-89. 
Demirag IS. 1998. Boards of directors' short-term perceptions and evidence of 
managerial short-termism in the UK. The European Journal of Finance 4: 195-211. 
Devers CE, McNamara G, Wiseman RM, Arrfelt M. 2008. Moving closer to the 
action: Examining compensation design effects on firm risk Organization Science 
19(4): 548-566. 
Dierickx I, Cool K. 1989. Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of 
competitive advantage. Management Science 35: 1504-1510. 
Dimmick DE, Murray VV. 1978. Correlates of substantive policy decisions in 
organizations: The case of human resource management. Academy of Management 
Journal 21: 611-623. 
Dougherty D. 1992. A Practice-Centered Model of Organizational Renewal through 
Product Innovation. Strategic Management Journal 13: 77-92. 
Duncan R, Weiss A. 1979. Organizational learning: Implications for organizational 
design. Research in Organiztaional Behavior 1: 75-123. 
Eisenhardt KM, Martin JA. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: What are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21: 1105-1121. 
Eriksson G. 1991. Human capital investments and labor mobility. Journal of Labor 
Economics 9: 236-254. 
Fama EF. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 88: 288-307. 
108 
 
Fama EF, Jensen MC. 1983. Corporations and private property: A conference 
sponsored by the hoover institution. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2): 301-325. 
Fiegenbaum A, Thomas H. 1988. Attitudes toward risk and the risk-return paradox: 
Prospect theory explanations. Academy of Management Journal 31(1): 85-106.   
Fritsch M, Meschede M. 2001. Product innovation, process innovation, and size. 
Review of Industrial Organization 19(3): 335-350. 
Galbraith J. 1973. Designing complex organizations. Addison-Wesley: Reading, 
Mass. 
Gambardella A. 1995. Science and innovation: The US pharmaceutical industry 
during the 1980s. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Gassmann O, Reepmeyer G, Von Zedtwitz M. 2004. Leading pharmaceutical 
innovation: Trends and drivers for growth in the pharmaceutical industry. Springer: 
Berlin. 
Geiger SW, Cashen LH. 2002. A multidimensional examination of slack and its 
impact on innovation. Journal of Managerial Issues 14(1): 68-84. 
Grant RM. 1996. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal 17(Winter): 109-122. 
Greve HR. 1998. Performnace, aspirations, and risky organizational change. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 44: 58-86. 
Greve HR. 2003. A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: 
Evidence from shipbuilding. Academy of Management Journal 46(6): 685-702. 
Greve HR. 2007. Exploration and exploitation in product innovation. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 16(5): 945-975. 
Gupta AK, Smith KG, Shalley CE. 2006. The interplay between exploration and 
exploitation. Academy of Management Journal 49(4): 693-706. 
Hair Jr. JF, Anderson RE, Tatham RL, Black WC. 1998. Multivariate data analysis 
(Fifth ed.). Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Hambrick DC, Cho TS, Chen M. 1996. The influence of top management team 
heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. Administrative Science Quarterly 41: 
659-684. 
Hambrick DC, Mason PA. 1984. Upper echelons: The organizations as a reflection 
of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9: 193-206. 
109 
 
Hambrick DC, Snow C. 1977. A contextual model of strategic decision making in 
organizations. In Taylor, RL, O'Connell, JJ, Zawacki, RA, Warrick, DD (eds.), 
Academy of Management Proceedings:  109-112. 
Hannan MT, Freeman J. 1977. The population ecology of organizations. American 
Journal of Sociology 82: 929-964. 
Hannan MT, Freeman J. 1984. Structural inertia and organizational change. 
American Sociological Review 49: 149-164. 
Hausman JA. 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251-
1271. 
He ZL, Wong PK. 2004. Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization Science 15(4): 481-494. 
Henderson R, Cockburn I. 1994. Measuring competence? Exploring firm effects in 
pharmaceutical research. Strategic Management Journal 15(Special Issue: 
Competitive organizational behavior): 63-84. 
Hinkle DE, Wiersma W, Jurs SG. 2003. Applied statistics for the behavioral 
sciences (5th ed.). Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston - New York. 
Hitt MA, Hoskisson RE, Ireland RD, Harrison JS. 1991. Effects of acquisitions on 
R&D inputs and ouputs. Academy of Management Journal 34(3): 693-706. 
Hitt MA, Ireland RD. 1985. Corporate distinctive competence, strategy, industry 
and performance. Strategic Management Journal 6: 273-293. 
Holmstrom B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 
10(1): 74-91. 
Hoskisson RE, Hitt MA, Johnson RA, Grossman W. 2002. Conflicting voices: The 
effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on 
corporate innovation strategies. Academy of Management Journal 45(4): 697-716. 
Hrebiniak LG, Joyce WF. 1985. Organizational adaptation: Strategic choice and 
environmental determinism. Administrative Science Quarterly 30(3): 336-349. 
http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/dummy_variables.htm. Last Accessed: 
June 5, 2009.  
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=8&n=6. Last accessed: June 2, 2009. 
http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?reg3. Last Accessed June 9, 2009. 
http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?xtivreg. Last Accessed June 9, 2009.  
110 
 
Jegers M. 1991. Prospect-Theory and the Risk-Return Relation - Some Belgian 
Evidence. Academy of Management Journal 34(1): 215-225. 
Jensen MC. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems. The Journal of Finance XLVIII(3): 831-880. 
Jensen MC, Meckling WH. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360. 
John TA, John K. 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure. The 
Journal of Finance XLVIII(3): 949-973. 
Kadiyali V. 1996. Entry, its deterrence, and its accommodation: A study of the US 
photographic film industry. RAND Journal of Economics 27(3): 452-478. 
Katila R, Ahuja G. 2002. Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of 
search behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal 
45(6): 183-1194. 
Katz R. 1982. The effects of group longevity on project communication and 
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 27(1): 81-104. 
Ketchen Jr. DJ, Palmer TB. 1999. Organizational performance: A test of competing 
perspectives. Journal of Management 25(5): 683-706. 
Kor YY. 2006. Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board 
compositions on R&D investment strategy. Strategic Management Journal 27(11): 
1081-1099. 
Kraatz MS, Zajac EJ. 2001. How organizational resources affect strategic change 
and performance in turbulent environments: Theory and evidence. Organization 
Science 12: 632-657. 
Lambert RA, Larcker DF, Weigelt K. 1993. The structure of organizational 
incentives. Administrative Science Quarterly 38(3): 438-461. 
Lant TK, Mezias SJ. 1990. Managing discontinuous change: A simulation study of 
organizational learning and entrepreneurship. Strategic Management Journal 11: 
147-179. 
Lant TK, Milliken FJ, Batra B. 1992. The role of managerial learning and 
interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration. 
Strategic Management Journal 13: 585-608. 
Lavie D, Rosenkopf L. 2006. Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance 
formation. Academy of Management Journal 49(4): 797-818. 
111 
 
Lawrence BS. 1997. The black box of organizational demography. Organization 
Science 8: 1-22. 
Leibenstein H. 1969. Organizational or frictional equilibria, X-efficiency, and the 
rate of innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 83: 600-623. 
Leonard-Barton D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in 
managing new product development. Strategic Management Journal 13: 42-62. 
Levinthal D, March JG. 1981. A model of adaptive organzational researh. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization 2: 307-333. 
Levinthal DA, March JG. 1993. The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management 
Journal 14: 95-112. 
Lubatkin MH, Simsek Z, Ling Y, Veiga JF. 2006. Ambidexterity and performance 
in small- to medium-sized firms: The pivotal role of top management team 
behavioral integration. Journal of Management 32(5): 646-672. 
MacCrimmon KR, Wehrung DA. 1986. Taking risks: The management of 
uncertainty. Free Press: New York. 
Malerba F, Orsenigo L. 2001. Towards a history firendly model of innovation, 
market structure and regualtion in the dynamics of the pharmaceutical industry: The 
age of random screening. CESPRI working paper WP n. 124. 
Malerba F, Orsenigo L. 2002. Innovation and market structure in the dynamics of 
the pharmaceutical industry and biotechnology: Towards a history-friendly model. 
Industrial and Corporate Change 11(4): 667-703. 
Mansfield E. 1986. Patents and innovation: An empirical study. Management 
Science 32(2): 173-181. 
March JG. 1976. The technology of foolishness. In March, JG, Olsen, JP (eds.), 
Ambiguity and choice in organizations:  69-81. Universitelsforlaget: Bergen. 
March JG. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. 
Organization Science 2: 71-87. 
March JG, Sharpira Z. 1987. Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking. 
Management Science 33: 1404-1418. 
March JG, Simon HA. 1958. Organizations. Wiley: New York. 
McDonald ML, Westphal JD. 2003. Getting by with the advice of their friends: 
CEOs' advice networks and firms' strategic responses to poor performance. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 48: 1-32. 
112 
 
Meyer A. 1982. Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly 
27: 515-537. 
Milgrom P, Roberts J. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-
Hall: London. 
Miller KD, Bromily P. 1990. Strategic risk and corporate performance: An analysis 
of alternative risk measures. Academy of Management Journal 33(4): 756-779. 
Miller KD, Leiblein MJ. 1996. Corporate risk-return relations: Returns variability 
versus downside risk. Academy of Management Journal 39(1): 91-122. 
Miller KD, Zhao M, Calantone RJ. 2006. Adding interpersonal learnings and tacit 
knowledge to March's exploration-exploitation model. Academy of Management 
Journal 49(4): 709-722. 
Miller TL. 2008. Internationalization, search, and change: An organizational 
learning model of strategic change in the pharmaceutical industry, Management, 
Vol. Ph.D. Texas A&M: College Station, TX (an unpublished dissertation). 
Mishina Y, Pollock TG, Porac JF. 2004. Are more resources always better for 
growth?  Resource stickiness in market and product expansion. Strategic 
Management Journal 25: 1179-1197. 
Moses DO. 1992. Organizational slack and risk-taking behavior: Tests of product 
pricing strategy. Journal of Organizational Change Management 5(3): 38-54. 
Murray AI. 1989. Top Management Group Heterogeneity and Firm Performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 10: 125-141. 
Nerkar A. 2003. Old is gold? The value of temporal exploration in the creation of 
new knowledge. Management Science 49(2): 211-229. 
Nerkar A, Roberts PW. 2004. Technological and product-market experience and the 
success of new product introductions in the pharmaceutical industry. Strategic 
Management Journal 25: 779-799. 
Neter J, Wasserman W, Kutner M. 1985. Applied Linear Statistical Models. 
Richard D. Irwin: Homewood, IL. 
Nohria N, Gulati R. 1996. Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of 
Management Journal 39(5): 1245-1264. 
Palmer TB, Wiseman RM. 1999. Decoupling risk taking from income stream 
uncertainty: A holistic model of risk. Strategic Management Journal 20: 1037-
1062. 
113 
 
Park HM. 2005. Linear regression models for panel data using SAS, STATA, 
LIMDEP, and SPSS, Vol. 2008. Indiana University, 
(http://www.indiana.edu/~statmath/stat/all/panel/index.html). 
Parr J, Phillips C. 1999. Signals, Sysems and Transforms (Second ed.). Prentice 
Hall: New Jersey. 
Pegels CC, Song YI, Yang B. 2000. Management heterogeneity, competitive 
interaction groups, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 21(9): 
911-923. 
Pettigrew A. 1992. On studying managerial elites. Strategic Management Journal 
13: 163-182. 
Podsakoff PM, MacKenzie SB, Podsakoff NP, Bachrach DG. 2008. Scholarly 
influence in the field of management: A bibliometric analysis of the determinants of 
university and author impact in the management literature in the past quarter 
centery. Journal of Management 34(4): 641-720. 
Pondy LR. 1967. Organizational conflict: Concepts and models. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 12(2): 296-320. 
Prahalad CK, Hamel G. 1990. The core competence of the corporation. Harvard 
Business Review 68(3): 79-91. 
Priem RL, Lyon DW, Dess GD. 1999. Inherent limitations of demographic proxies 
in top management team heterogeneity research. Journal of Management 25(6): 
935-953. 
Rajagopalan N, Datta DK. 1996. CEO characteristics: Does industry matter? 
Academy of Management Journal 39(1): 197-215. 
Ramos-Rodriguez A, Ruiz-Navarro J. 2004. Changes in the intellectual structure of 
strategic management research - A bibliometric study of the Strategic Management 
Journal, 1980-2000. Strategic Management Journal 25: 981-1004. 
Ratliff JM. 2002. NTT DoCoMo and its i-mode success: Origins and implications. 
California Management Review 44(Spring): 55-71. 
Rosenkopf L, Nerkar A. 2001. Beyond local search: Boundary-spanning, 
exploration, and impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal 
22(4): 287-306. 
Rothaermel FT, Deeds DL. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal 25(3): 201-221. 
114 
 
Sanders WG. 2001. Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock 
option pay. Academy of Management Journal 44: 477-492. 
Sanders WG, Hambrick DC. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO 
stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management 
Journal 50: 1055-1078. 
Schilling MA. 2003. Technological leapfrogging: Lessons from the U.S. video 
game console industry. California Management Review 45(Spring): 6-32. 
Sharfman MP, Wolf G, Chase RB, Tanski DA. 1988. Antecedents of organizational 
slack. Academy of Management Review 13: 601-614. 
Siegel PA, Hambrick DC. 2005. Pay disparities within top management groups: 
Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms. 
Organization Science 16(3): 259-274. 
Simon HA. 1945. Administrative behavior (4th ed.). The Free Press. 
Simons T, Pelled LH, Smith KA. 1999. Making use of difference: Diversity, debate, 
and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams. Academy of 
Management Journal 42(6): 662-673. 
Singh JV. 1986. Performance, slack and risk-taking in organizational decision 
making. Academy of Management Journal 29: 562-585. 
Smith KG, Collins CJ, Clark KD. 2005. Existing knowledge, knowledge creation 
capability and the rate of new product introduction in high technology firms. 
Academy of Management Journal 48(2): 346-357. 
Smith WK, Tushman ML. 2005. Managing strategic contradictions: A top 
management model for managing innovation streams. Organization Science 16(5): 
522-536. 
Snow CC, Hrebiniak LG. 1980. Strategy, distinctive competence, and 
organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 25: 317-335. 
Sonnenfeld JA. 1988. The hero's farewell: What happens when CEOs retire. 
Oxford University Press: USA. 
Sorensen JB, Stuart TE. 2000. Aging, obsolescence, and organizational innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 45(1): 81-112. 
Staw BM, Sandelands LE, Dutton JE. 1981. Threat-rigidity effects in organizational 
behavior: A multi-level analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly 26: 501-524. 
115 
 
Stuart TE, Podolny JM. 1996. Local search and the evolution of technological 
capabilities. Strategic Management Journal 17(Special Issue: Evolutionary 
Perspectives on Strategy): 21-38. 
Tan FB, Gallupe RB. 2006. Aligning business and information systems thinking: A 
cognitive approach. IEEE Transactions of Engineering Management 53(2): 223-
237. 
Tan J, Peng MW. 2003. Organizational slack and firm performance during 
economic transitions: Two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic 
Management Journal 24: 1249-1263. 
Taylor A, Greve HR. 2006. Superman or the Fantastic Four? Knowledge 
combination and experience in innovative teams. Academy of Management Journal 
49(4): 723-740. 
Thompson JD. 1967. Organizations in action. McGraw Hill. 
Tihanyi L, Ellstrand AE, Daily CM, Dalton DR. 2000. Composition of the top 
management team and firm international diversification. Journal of Management 
26(6): 1157-1177. 
Tosi HL, Gomez-Mejia LR. 1994. CEO compensation monitoring and firm 
performance. Academy of Management Journal 37: 1002-1016. 
Tversky A, Kahneman D. 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science 185(4157): 1124-1131. 
Voss GB, Sirdeshmukh D, Voss ZG. 2008. The effects of slack resources and 
environmental threat on product exploraiton and exploitation. Academy of 
Management Journal 51(1): 147-164. 
Vroom G. 2006. Organizational design and the intensity of rivalry. Management 
Science 52(11): 1689-1702. 
Vroom V, Pahl B. 1971. Relationship between age and risk-taking among 
managers. Journal of Applied Psychology 55: 399-405. 
Wadhwa A, Kotha S. 2006. Knowledge creation through external venturing: 
Evidence from the telecommunications equipment manufacturing industry. 
Academy of Management Journal 49(4): 819-835. 
Ward A, Sonnenfeld J, Kimberly J. 1995. In search of a kingdom: Determinants of 
subsequent career outcomes for chief executives who are fired. Human Resource 
Management 34: 117-139. 
116 
 
Westphal JD, Fredrickson JW. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director 
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal 22: 1113-1137. 
Westphal JD, Zajac EJ. 1994. Substance and symbolism in CEO's long-term 
incentive plans. Administrative Science Quarterly 39(3): 367-390. 
Wiersema MF, Bantel KA. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate 
strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35(1): 91-121. 
Wiersema MF, Bird A. 1993. Organizational Demography in Japanese Firms - 
Group Heterogeneity, Individual Dissimilarity, and Top Management Team 
Turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36(5): 996-1025. 
Williamson OE. 1963. A model of rational managerial behavior. In Cyert, RM, 
March, JG (eds.), A behavioral theory of the firm:  237-252. Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Williamson OE. 1964. The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial 
objectives in a thoery of the firm. Prenhice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Winter SG. 2000. The satisficing principle in capability learning. Strategic 
Management Journal 10/11(Special Issue: The evolution of firm capabilities): 981-
996. 
Wu JF, Tu RT. 2007. CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavioral 
agency explanation. Journal of Business Research 60(5): 482-492. 
Yanadori Y, Marler JH. 2006. Compensation strategy: Does business strategy 
influence compensation in high-technology firms? Strategic Management Journal 
27: 559-570. 
Zollo M, Winter SG. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities. Organization Science 13(3): 339-351. 
Zott C. 2003. Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intraindustry differential 
firm performance: Insights from a simulation study. Strategic Management Journal 
24: 97-125. 
 
 
117 
 
APPENDIX A: 
 
PLOTS OF ALL INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES ON 
EXPLORATORY AND EXPLOITATIVE SEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
APPENDIX B: 
 
HISTOGRAMS OF  
UNTRANSFORMED AND TRANSFORMED VARIABLES 
 
Exploratory Search (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
Exploratory Search (Constant + Log Transformed) 
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Exploitative Search (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Recoverable Slack (Variable dropped because of too many missing observations) 
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Available Slack (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Available Slack (Log transformed) 
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Potential Slack (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential Slack (After outlier removal – no other transformations needed) 
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Actual-to-Desired Performance (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual-to-Desired Performance (After outlier removal – no other transformations 
needed) 
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CEO Current Ratio (No transformation needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
TMT Current Ratio (No transformation needed) 
 
 
136 
 
 
 
 
Firm size (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm size (Log transformed) 
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R&D Ratio (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D Ratio (Log transformed) 
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Capital Structure (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital Structure (After outlier removal + Constant + Sq Rt Transform) 
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Tobin’s Q (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q (Log Transformed) 
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CEO Age (No transformation needed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TMT Size (No transformation needed) 
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CEO Equity Ownership (Untransformed) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CEO Equity Ownership (Log transformed) 
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TMT Equity Ownership (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
TMT Equity Ownership (Log Transformed) 
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Repeated Cites (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
Repeated Cites (Log Transformed) 
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Unique Cites (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
 
Unique Cites (Log Transformed) 
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Prior Patents (Untransformed) 
 
 
 
Prior Patents (Log Transformed) 
 
 
 
 
